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The debate on norms and their effectiveness is taking place at the international political 
level in parallel to the debate on norms in norm scholarship. This thesis aimed to bring 
them together by applying a theoretical framework on norms to the prohibition of force 
norm that was contested by Russia in Crimea in 2014 and debated in the United Nations 
Security Council. The framework predicted that different types of norm contestation have 
different effects on the norm’s robustness – the latter is expected to strengthen when it 
predominantly faces applicatory contestation and to weaken when it faces validity 
contestation. Through qualitative document analysis, the research question on how 
Russia’s contestation of the prohibition of force norm affected the norm’s robustness was 
answered. This study firstly established the predominant type of contestation by Russia 
to be applicatory contestation. Differently than expected, this type of contestation was 
found to have increased the robustness of the prohibition of force norm along the validity 
dimension (states belief in the norm) but decreased along the facticity dimension (guiding 
states actions). Because the dimensions developed in diverging directions in similar 
volumes, the overall robustness of the norm that was measured before Russia’s 
contestation (2009-2013) and after (2014-2018) remained at the same level of moderately 
high based on this study’s indicators. The theoretical expectations that predicted a change 
in robustness were therefore not affirmed. In turn, this study not only demonstrated the 
significance of studying the two robustness dimensions separately but also that they 
should not be assumed to develop in the same direction. Accordingly, this thesis produced 
empirical backing to the theoretical framework on norm robustness and different types of 
norm contestation that was lacking. Secondly, it provided insights into the robustness of 
the prohibition of force norm and how it was affected by Russia’s mode of norm 
contestation. Lastly, this thesis combined norm scholarship with the international political 
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The practice of international relations is facing a debate on its condition, as is the 
discipline of International Relations (IR). The contemporary world order would be in 
crisis (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Hofmann, 2020; Ikenberry, 2018). Central to this debate 
on the future of the international order is the question about the norms that underpin it 
(Öniş & Kutlay, 2020). Specific norms central to the hegemonic core and peaceful 
relations between states would be under challenge (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019; 
Sandholtz, 2019), cascading (Fisk & Ramos, 2014), or even dying (Panke & Petersohn, 
2016).  
One of the norms that has come under challenge is the norm prohibiting the use of force 
between states (PoF). Thomas M. Franck’s question in 1970 of “Who killed Article 
2(4)?”1 on the PoF norm is being revived fifty years later, as the norm is deemed 
ineffective (UNSC, SC/13344, 2018) as well as “dead” (Kress, 2019). Arguments about 
the alleged weakness of this norm, and the United Nations’ “failure to uphold it” (UNSC, 
S/PV.8262, 2018, pp. 18, 80), would point to recent violations of the prohibition of force 
by states, starting with Russia’s behaviour in Crimea in 2014 (Kress, 2019; UNSC, 
S/PV.8262, 2018, pp. 15, 18, 22, 29, 33; SC/13344, 2018).2 Against the background of 
this observation, it is implied that the engagement of the Russian Federation with the PoF 
norm in Crimea would have damaged the norm’s strength. 
The arguments in the debate on the PoF norm assume that violations of a norm indicate 
the norm’s weakness – an assumption that is not unique to the debate on the PoF norm. 
This logic has been applied to international norms in general, as expressed by states in 
international debates (UNSC, SC/13344, 2018); in legal scholarship (Brunnée & Toope, 
2001), as well as by IR scholars (see: McKeown (2009), Heller et al. (2012), and Panke 
& Petersohn (2012, 2016)). This debate is not centred around the question of whether 
states’ non-compliance with international norms is in general problematic – especially
 
1 The text of Article 2(4) reads: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” (U.N. Charter, 1945, p. 3 art. 2, para. 4). 
2 The 8262nd meeting of the United Nations Security Council was described in its meeting coverage as 
“Security Council Must Rectify Failure to Prohibit Use of Force”, in which several states raised concerns 
about the prohibition of force norm being breached by Russia in Crimea, including the representatives of 
The Netherlands (p.15), the United Kingdom (p.18), Sweden (p.22), France (p.29) and Lithuania (p.33) 
(UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018; SC/13344, 2018). More on this meeting can be found on page 68. 
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not concerning norms as fundamental to peace as the PoF norm. Rather, it centralises the 
impact of a norm being challenged on the norm itself. In contrast to the logic reflected in 
this debate on norms – namely to assume a weakening effect of non-compliance on the 
norm – this study argues, in line with current scholarship on norm contestation, that it 
should be questioned and studied whether behaviour challenging a norm is in fact 
problematic for the norm itself.  
IR scholars that focus on norms tend to be divided on this issue, as there are two sides in 
norm contestation scholarship that expect diverging outcomes. One strand of norm 
scholarship is arguing along the lines presented above: this challenging behaviour – 
referred to as norm contestation from now onwards – is expected to destabilise the norm 
and impair its effectiveness (Heller et al., 2012; McKeown, 2009; Panke & Petersohn, 
2012, 2016). On the contrary, other norm scholars argue that as states engage with the 
norm through contestation, the norm’s strength is expected to increase (Barnes, 2016; 
Krook & True, 2012; Wiener, 2007). Applying the scholarship on norm contestation to 
the debate on the PoF norm, this means that Russia’s contestation could have positively 
affected the PoF norm, contrary to the pessimistic outlook on the norm’s effectiveness 
reflected in the international debate (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018; SC/13344, 2018). This 
exact question of how Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm in Crimea affected the 
norm’s robustness is the first issue that this study aims to draw attention to. 
This lack of consensus among norm scholars on whether norm contestation leads to 
strengthening or weakening of a norm requires further investigation. This research puzzle 
will be addressed by applying norm scholarship to the PoF norm. To do so, this study 
relies on existing literature that goes beyond perceiving the effects of norm contestation 
to be either negative or positive, which allows for exploration of when norm contestation 
would lead to which results. More specifically, it will draw on the framework provided 
by Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, through which contestation is perceived to have the 
potential to both strengthen and weaken a norm’s robustness, depending on which type 
of norm contestation is taking place (2018, p. 58). As the link between norm robustness 
and type of norm contestation is still understudied, nevertheless, there have been very few 
empirical investigations into when norm contestation has which effects on the norm’s 
robustness (Sandholtz, 2019, pp. 139, 140).  
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The second issue this study aims to contribute to – in addition to gaining insights into the 
effects of norm contestation on the prohibition of force norm – is filling this empirical 
gap in norm scholarship. By empirically studying the effects of norm contestation, and 
by distinguishing between types of contestation for this purpose, this thesis will provide 
insights into the robustness of the prohibition of force norm and contributes to scholarship 
on norm contestation by empirically testing the framework provided by Deitelhoff and 
Zimmerman. In this way, this study also hopes to address the third issue concerning the 
parallel debates on norms inside academia and outside in international politics.  
The discussion on the PoF norm is primarily taking place in international relations, as the 
norm’s effectiveness is being questioned by states in UN meetings (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 
2018; SC/13344, 2018). Meanwhile, certain norm scholars have referred to the PoF norm 
as a robust norm (Brunnée & Toope, 2017, p. 2; Sandholtz, 2019, p. 142). Norm studies 
have not zoomed into the PoF norm, but rather focused on how non-western actors would 
have contested other security-related and/or western-liberal norms competing with the 
PoF norm – namely the Responsibility to Protect (Acharya, 2013; Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann, 2018; Jose & Stefes, 2018; Welsh, 2019) or anticipatory self-defence 
(Brunnée & Toope, 2017; Fisk & Ramos, 2014). Accordingly, this study calls for a focus 
on a ‘universal’ norm through a framework that does not assume the effects of norm 
contestation by a non-western actor to be weakening. It is important to apply this 
framework to the PoF norm because this norm, as codified in the UN Charter (art. 2, para. 
4), is considered to be one of the cornerstones of the international order (Kress, 2019), 
yet is also perceived as “failing” in the international political debate ever since Russia’s 
annexed Crimea (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018, pp. 18, 80). This study argues that before the 
PoF norm can be declared dead and fingers can be pointed in the political debate, the 
strength of the norm needs to be analysed through the framework of norm contestation 
before and after it was contested by Russia, to establish whether the PoF has indeed 
suffered a loss of robustness. To provide input that allows the political debate on the norm 
to be based on a theoretical framework and an analysis of the PoF norm, this study is 
guided by the following research question:  
“How did Russia’s contestation of the Prohibition of Force norm in Crimea affect 
the norm’s robustness?” 
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This question allows for an investigation of this specific instance of contestation and its 
type, yet it is part of the wider question about the connection between the type of norm 
contestation and robustness. To answer this question, this study primarily relies upon the 
framework of Deitelhoff and Zimmermann. To investigate how norm robustness is 
affected, the question one should ask is not whether norm contestation is taking place or 
not. Instead, one should investigate, according to Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, which 
type of contestation is taking place (2018, p. 52), as norm scholars consider contestation 
to be common practice and even inherent to norms (Brunnée & Toope, 2017; Deitelhoff 
& Zimmermann, 2018, p. 52; Wiener, 2014). Along these lines, the first type is 
applicatory contestation – meaning that the actor is challenging how the norm should be 
applied, which could potentially strengthen the norm’s robustness. The second type, 
validity contestation, could weaken the norm’s robustness, referring to an actor 
challenging whether the norm and its core are valid (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, 
pp. 51, 58). Norm robustness, in turn, is understood as comprising two dimensions: the 
extent to which states’ actions are guided by the norm (facticity) and to which they accept 
the norm (validity) (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 2). To test this framework, a 
‘case of contestation’ would have to be selected to determine which type of contestation 
is taking place and whether it affected the norm’s robustness as theorised. Russia’s 
practices in Crimea in 2014 provide a suitable case to test this framework, as these 
practices did not comply with and challenged the PoF norm, and norm contestation in this 
study is considered to include – yet not to be limited to – non-compliance. In this way, 
the framework of Deitelhoff and Zimmermann can be tested, as well as the statements 
that the PoF norm would have weakened (UNSC, SC/13344, 2018). Drawing upon this 
theoretical framework, the hypotheses put forward by this study are as follows:  
H1: “If the predominant mode of contestation of a norm is applicatory 
contestation, then the norm’s robustness strengthens.” 
H2: “If the predominant mode of contestation of a norm is validity contestation, 
then the norm’s robustness weakens.” 
With a view on the case of Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm and the research 
question stated above, these more general theoretical expectations imply that if Russia’s 
contestation with the PoF norm is found to be primarily applicatory contestation, then the 
robustness of the PoF is expected to have increased after the annexation of Crimea. 
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However, if it is found to be mainly validity contestation instead, the robustness of the 
PoF is expected to decrease (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 58).  
The framework on norm robustness and norm contestation will be tested by first 
determining which type of contestation Russia took part in when contesting the PoF norm 
in Crimea. The expectations regarding the effects on the robustness of the PoF norm will 
be based on the type of contestation that is found to be predominant in this case. The type 
of contestation and the level of robustness will be determined relying mainly on primary 
sources from the UN. The level of robustness, based on its validity and facticity, will then 
be examined before Russia’s annexation of Crimea (t1= 2009-2013) and after (t2= 2014-
2018), in order to reject or affirm the theoretical expectations on the changes in the norm’s 
robustness.  
To sum up, this study aims to establish how Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm 
affected the norm’s robustness. This thesis wishes to contribute to the empirical testing 
of the framework on different types of norm contestation and their effects; to provide 
insights on the strength of the PoF norm, and to bridge the gap between norm literature 
and the international political debate on norms.  
In the next, theoretical chapter, a thorough background on norm research and literature 
will be provided, from the introduction of norm research into IR scholarship to the study 
of norm contestation and robustness, in which the terms central to this study will be 
conceptualised. After that, the methodology chapter will discuss the research design, case 
selection, methods, and data used in this study, as well as the operationalisation of the 
variables and indicators. The theory and methods discussed in these chapters will then be 
applied to the empirical case in the analysis, which consists of two sections. Firstly, the 
practices of Russia in Crimea contesting the PoF norm will be presented and accordingly 
labelled as either applicatory or validity contestation. The second part of the analysis 
chapter lays out the robustness of the PoF norm during t1 and t2 and subsequently 
compares them. This is followed by a conclusion on the findings concerning the type of 
norm contestation and potential change in robustness. Finally, the implications of these 
findings for norm research and for the norm prohibiting the use of force will be concluded, 




Norm Contestation and Norm Robustness – A Theoretical Framework  
 
This chapter lays out the theoretical background of this thesis by conceptualising and 
theorising its core concepts and placing them within relevant scholarship and a wider 
theoretical framework. To apprehend where the concepts situate themselves, the 
introduction of norm research into International Relations literature will first be 
elaborated upon. Accordingly, the chapter presents the way in which norms were studied 
differently over time, leading up to the study of norm contestation. In turn, a closer look 
will be taken at how different types of norm contestation – applicatory and validity – are 
theorised to be connected to norm robustness, which consists of a validity and facticity 
element. A thorough understanding of this theoretical framework on norm contestation 
and norm robustness is necessary to be able to empirically test the theoretical 
expectations it puts forward, and, in turn, to answer the research question. 
 
As the overall objective of this thesis is to study Russia’s contestation of the prohibition 
of force (PoF) norm and the subsequent effects on the norm’s robustness, this chapter 
elaborates upon the relevant concepts and theoretical framework that function as the 
foundation of this study. Both norm contestation and norm robustness need to be 
conceptualised and theorised before applying them. However, these concepts should not 
be studied without first understanding their background. Firstly, it is important to 
comprehend the fundamental term behind norm robustness and norm contestation: norms. 
The concept of norms can be applied to a wide range of research areas and its meaning 
may vary accordingly. Therefore, it needs to be established how norms are understood 
and studied within world politics specifically – as this directly speaks to Russia’s 
contestation of the PoF norm. After an elaboration on norms and the study of norms in 
International Relations, this chapter will conceptualise norm contestation and norm 
robustness and describe the different forms and types they take.  
Norm Research in International Relations Scholarship 
Norms are part of several research disciplines, in which they are conceptualised and 
studied differently. It is therefore important to establish where the area of norm research 
used in this thesis situates itself, and how it accordingly conceptualises and studies norms. 
This discipline may shape how norms are studied and norm research may impact that 
discipline in turn. For instance, international norms are likely to be approached differently 
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from the angle of legal scholarship in comparison to International Relations (IR) 
scholarship, while these disciplines may closely relate to each other. One field may focus 
on laws when studying norms, for example, while the other studies behaviour  (Brunnée 
& Toope, 2018, p. 1). The way that norms are perceived matters too, as legal and early 
IR scholarship both reflected the notion that norms are stable and precise, or at least they 
should be (Brunnne & Toope, 2018, p. 1; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 57; 
Hoffmann, 2010, p. 12). Moreover, legal and neoliberal IR scholarship was paired with a 
traditional, materialist-rationalist take on norms, considering them to be fixed and 
reflecting the interest of powerful states (Bloomfield, 2015, p. 312; Fehl, 2018, p. 10; 
Hoffmann, 2010, p. 2). However, the way in which norms were studied developed over 
time along with different IR theories.  After constructivism became part of the mainstream 
IR theories in the 1980s, in turn, IR scholarship started paying more attention to norms in 
general, as well as to norms’ changing nature (Bloomfield, 2015; Brunnée & Toope, 
2018; Hoffmann, 2010).  
The constructivist account on norms has laid the basis for present-day norm research 
(Bloomfield, 2015, p. 310; Hoffmann, 2010, p. 2) and for this thesis accordingly. The 
popularity of norm studies, especially at the end of the 20th century, grew hand in hand 
with the popularity of constructivism in IR, especially at the end of the 20th century 
(Hoffmann, 2010, p. 2). The ‘new’ approach to norms – now known as traditional 
constructivism – allowed IR scholars to study norms in more depth and to consider norms’ 
relation to change and stability (Brunnée & Toope, 2018, p. 3; Hoffmann, 2010, pp. 2, 
12). The foundation of this approach to norms was laid by Sikkink and Finnemore, who 
define norms as “standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” 
(1998, p. 891). As opposed to traditional IR approaches, these standards were not 
considered to simply exist. Instead, constructivists regarded norms to be constructed, as 
are actors’ interests and actions (Hoffmann, 2010, pp. 2, 8). This take on norms thus 
opened up a new field of research – the study of how norms emerge, how they diffuse, 
and how they cascade (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).3 
 
3 For other central contributions on the dynamics, diffusion, and evolution of norms besides Finnemore &  
Sikkink’s “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998), see: Winston “Norm structure, 
diffusion, and evolution: A conceptual approach” (2018) , and Wunderlich (2013) “Theoretical 
Approaches in Norm Dynamics”. 
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From Norm Diffusion to Norm Contestation 
It may be said that constructivism offered a new lens through which to study international 
norms. This early and traditional constructivist account on norms nonetheless remained 
limited to the study of norms as independent variables, as causes – studying the diffusion 
of norms; studying if norms are guiding or causing specific behaviour; if they lead to 
political change (Bloomfield, 2015, p. 311; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Hoffmann, 
2010, p. 5; Wiener, 2004, p. 198). Consequently, a new stream of constructivism 
appeared, criticising this approach towards norms and its limits (Bloomfield, 2015; 
Hoffmann, 2010).  
Earlier norm research tended to examine the impact or influence a norm and its diffusion 
could have in the international order, taking the norm as a cause of change. Critical 
constructivists (for example: Acharya (2004), Payne (2001), Wiener (2004, 2007, 2014), 
Sanders (2018)), in turn, challenged this conventional constructivist approach towards 
norms. They pointed out that the study of norms (diffusion) as a cause for change or 
specific behaviour, assumes that norms and their meanings are fixed, stable, and universal 
– that a norm’s content is set and interpreted in the same way by all norm addressees 
(Hoffmann, 2010, p. 12; Wiener, 2007, p. 48, 2009, p. 176). For example, Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s work on norm change focused on how norms are emerging, cascading, and 
internalised (1998), yet neglects how norms themselves can change in meaning – in the 
behaviour they imply. Therefore, critical constructivists aimed to shift the focus of norm 
research from studying the role of norms and their diffusion in political or international 
change, to studying how the norm itself changes. This opened the door to an understudied 
field, according to Antje Wiener, that examines the meaning of a norm – how it changes 
and how such meaning-making occurs (Hoffmann, 2010, p. 12; Wiener, 2004, pp. 198–
199).  
A focus on the process of meaning-making of norms allows for a closer look into a norm 
in question and how it evolves. Through a critical constructivist lens, the process of 
meaning-making refers to social practices, to interactions engaging with the norm and 
enacting a version of it – enacting the norm’s “meaning-in-use” (Wiener, 2009, p. 176). 
This latter notion accordingly implies that there is not one universal interpretation of the 
norm. Rather, from this perspective, norms would face diverging interpretations and even 
disputes over its meaning-in-use (Wiener, 2004, p. 201, 2009, p. 176). This process, in 
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which norm addressees express disapproval or objection to the norm and its meaning-in-
use through social practice, is conceptualised by Wiener as norm contestation (2014, p. 
1). Norm contestation as a concept and a theory is central to this thesis, and thus requires 
further elaboration. 
Criticism towards the way norms were dealt with in earlier constructivism and IR 
scholarship in general were taken into account in the theory on norm contestation, as the 
basis was laid by Antje Wiener (2004). The theory of norm contestation challenges the 
study of norms as independent variables (Hoffmann, 2010, p. 5) that remain constant and 
are complied with and successfully diffused by actors (Bloomfield, 2015, p. 313). 
Furthermore, it criticises earlier norm research that tended to focus on cases where, 
supposedly, ‘enlightened’ western actors would spread norms successfully and linearly 
in the western normative order, ‘guiding’ other non-western actors that would passively 
follow them (Acharya, 2004, pp. 249, 250, 259; Bloomfield, 2015, p. 313; Wiener, 2004, 
p. 191). As a response, the theory of norm contestation started from the premise that norm 
diffusion does not have to be a successful and linear process led by western states.4 It 
moreover aimed to take into account the individual agency of states – their ability to resist 
the norm’s meaning-in-use and consequently contest it (Bloomfield, 2015, pp. 313, 314; 
Wiener, 2004, p. 192). 
This liberal-western bias, however, is still visible even now that norm research’s focus 
includes norm contestation and is no longer limited to the study of norm diffusion. A 
closer look at recent norm literature reflects a shift in focus on non-western actors 
following the norm to non-western actors contesting liberal-western norms, such as 
specific human rights or the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (see: Badescu & Weiss 
(2010); Burai (2016); Jose & Stefes (2018)). This means that the focus still tended to be 
on liberal-western norms that would be entrepreneured5 and spread by western actors, a 
process that would be thwarted by non-western actors. For instance, Russia has been 
included as an actor several times in norm contestation studies on how the state would 
 
4 With ‘western’ actors this study refers primarily to states in North America, Western Europe, and 
Australasia 
5 Norm-entrepreneurs are understood as actors that promote new norms or different versions of existing 
norms and the normative order accordingly (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 896–899). This change 
would be resisted by norm-antipreneurs which aim to remain the status quo (Bloomfield, 2015, p. 311). 
The term norm-spoilers, in turn, is used to refer to actors who oppose and try to undermine the already 
established norms (Sanders, 2018, p. 272) 
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have challenged and accordingly destabilised such ‘western-liberal’ norms (Allison, 
2014; Badescu & Weiss, 2010; Jose & Stefes, 2018). However, research investigating the 
contestation of norms that are not particularly ‘western-liberal’ or not assumed to be 
opposed or weakened by non-western actors, seems to be lacking. It is important to be 
aware of this bias when engaging with norm contestation theory, as it 
“creates narratives about norm emergence, diffusion, and change from western or 
Eurocentric vantage points, ignoring non-western perspectives and the colonial and 
postcolonial power asymmetries in the production and stabilisation of international 
norms” (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 14).  
Even when norm research is not focused on liberal-western norms, the hegemonic 
normative community in the current international order is still one with a liberal and 
western core, which in turn affects what is considered norm compliance and what is 
considered norm contestation. 
Along these lines, recent norm studies have been more attentive of who takes part in norm 
contestation. Norm diffusion is not necessarily performed by western actors and norm 
contestation not solely by non-western actors (Bloomfield, 2015, pp. 313, 314; Deitelhoff 
& Zimmermann, 2019, p. 14). At the same time, norm literature does not provide a 
common answer to the question of which actors can perform norm contestation – it is not 
clear whether this performance is limited to states. Some norm scholars have not only 
scrutinised IR scholarship for overlooking the agency of single states, but also of 
individuals (Brunnée & Toope, 2017; Walton, 2015; Wiener, 2004, 2018). Wiener, for 
example, focuses on norm contestation through the practice of non-state actors in her 
newest book (2018). In general, however, states still seem to remain the primary 
addressees of international norms, especially norms enshrined in the UN Charter.  
A more pressing debate in existing norm literature than who is performing norm 
contestation, relates to how it takes place. When labelling practices and interactions as 
norm contestation, recent studies (such as: Brunnne & Toope, 2017; Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann, 2018, 2019) demonstrate that the act of contesting a norm can go beyond 
Antje Wiener’s definition – beyond the expressed objection of an actor towards a norm 
(2014, p. 1). Drawing upon these recent studies, the conceptualisation of norm 
contestation will be revisited for the purpose of this thesis. This signifies that the 
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understanding of norm contestation will not be limited to actions directed against the 
norm but extends to actions and discourse challenging the norm and its meaning. For 
instance, because the meaning of norms will be considered as ever-changing and never 
fixed, actors interpret the norm differently and challenge it accordingly (Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann, 2018, 2019).6 Along the same lines, discussions on a norm at the 
international level may lead to stabilisation or even more disagreement on its meaning, 
challenging the norm as a whole or a version of it, as Deitelhoff and Zimmermann suggest 
(2018, p. 58). Accordingly, specific behaviour can engage with a norm and consequently 
contest the norm and its meaning, without necessarily expressing its opposition to the 
norm – without disagreeing with the norm or intending to oppose it per se. It is important 
to note that violations of the norm are considered to challenge a norm and are thus part of 
contestation, as their justifications tend to be, yet norm contestation goes far beyond 
violations. The norm does not have to be breached for it to be contested, as contestation 
can also take place through a debate on the norm’s meaning-in-use by states at for instance 
international forums. Any practice that challenges the norm and its meaning is considered 
to be norm contestation in this study. A differentiation between official breaches of the 
norm; alleged violations, and non-compliance, is not significant for the conceptualisation 
of norm contestation in this study. A practice will not be understood as contestation if the 
norm is either complied with without debate on or questioning of the norm’s 
interpretation, or when the norm is lifted according to its own exceptions – when the use 
of force is authorised by the UN or when allowed according to the right to self-defence 
(U.N. Charter, 1945 art. 2, par. 4, art. 39, art. 51). In the end, norm contestation is 
conceptualised as behaviour that engages with the norm and consequently challenges its 
meaning-in-use.   
The discussion on how norm contestation is understood to take place directly relates to 
the way norms are studied. Now that the focus in scholarship has shifted from norms as 
causes to norms as constructed outcomes, norm contestation has been studied similarly 
to the latter. Most contemporary norm studies take norm contestation as an outcome and 
aim to find and explain the phenomenon’s cause (Fehl & Rosert, 2020; Jose, 2017; 
Wiener, 2004). This debate is still ongoing – even among scholars applying the same 
 
6 This type of contestation is defined by Deitelhoff and Zimmermann as applicatory contestation (2018, p. 
57). The two Types of Norm Contestation (validity and facticity) will be discussed further on. 
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approach such as critical constructivism, a consensus on what triggers norm contestation 
seems to be lacking. Different scholars argue that the level or manner of norm contestation 
might depend on certain preconditions, such as the norm’s type (Brunnée & Toope, 2001), 
ambiguity (Jose, 2017; Wiener, 2004), legalisation (Brunnée & Toope, 2017; Percy, 
2019), or relations with other norms (Fehl & Rosert, 2020). What all these studies have 
in common, is that they take norm contestation as an anticipated outcome and try to 
explain it. While they might not agree on the degree of contestation or the reason behind 
it, they all seem to suggest that norm contestation and interpretive ambiguities generally 
exist and occur. Though norms may face contestation to different extents, one may 
assume, based on the previous observation, that norms inherently face contestation 
(Brunnée & Toope, 2017; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 52, 2019; Wiener, 2014). 
Perceiving norm contestation as a given, however, raises an important question: what are 
the implications of norm contestation? Even though there have been very few empirical 
studies looking into the consequences of norm contestation (see: Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann (2018); Welsh (2019), Brunnée & Toope (2017)), or perhaps precisely for 
that reason, norm scholars are once again divided on the effects of contestation – whether 
it positively or negatively affects the norms. While the perception that norm contestation 
is not linked to norm strength exists (see: Hurd (2013)), norm research generally seems 
to offer “two competing hypotheses: One branch of norm research often conceptualises 
contestation as a sign of norm weakening. By contrast, another branch assigns 
contestation a normative power of its own, which strengthens norms.” (Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann, 2018, p. 51).  
The former notion that norm contestation has a negative impact on norms is echoed by 
several norm scholars (see: Heller et al. (2012); Panke & Petersohn (2012, 2016)), as in 
legal scholarship. Accordingly, a norm’s weakness could be traced back to practices that 
contest the norm, especially to non-compliance and violations (Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann, 2018, p. 53). This narrative is also visible in international debates, 
especially when norms are described as “ineffective” or even “dead” when actors violate 
it or states disagree on its meaning (Kress, 2019; Panke & Petersohn, 2012; UNSC, 
S/PV.8262, 2018, pp. 18, 20). Meanwhile, the other strand of norm scholars believes that 
this process of engagement, of meaning-making strengthens a norm, as it may revive the 
debate on and commitment to the norm (Barnes, 2016, p. 103). Antje Wiener even argues 
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that contestation might be necessary for a norm to become legitimate (2007, p. 48, 2014, 
p. 50), ultimately strengthening the norm.7 
Based on these diverging takes on norm contestation and its consequences, this thesis 
does not expect the effects of norm contestation to be an either-or situation. Firstly, it 
does not assume that there is a single modus operandi in which norm contestation takes 
place, hence the redefining of norm contestation as a concept. Secondly, the process of 
norm contestation by definition is not assumed to always lead to norm strengthening, nor 
that it naturally weakens it. One may expect that contestation could in some cases 
strengthen a norm’s robustness and weaken it in others. As previous literature often 
tended to side with one of the competing hypotheses, a general framework was missing 
that aimed to explain the link between norm contestation to norm robustness based on the 
premise that norm contestation comes in different forms and can affect norm robustness 
differently (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 51). That is, at least, until this framework 
was offered by Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (2018, 2019).  
This framework will be applied, taking norm contestation as an independent variable 
instead of a dependent variable. Therefore, the objective is not to find the causes of norm 
contestation, but rather the effects. If  norm contestation is understood in the way that 
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann propose, meaning as a variable that has both the potential of 
strengthening a norm as well as weakening it (2018, 2019), the question arises under 
which conditions contestation leads to one outcome or the other. In contrast to previous 
norm research, Deitelhoff and Zimmermann do not ask the question of what leads to norm 
contestation, or whether norm contestation takes place or not. Rather, they ask the 
question of what type of contestation takes place, and how that type affects the norm’s 
robustness accordingly (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 52). While these scholars 
do not assume that norm contestation is the only factor affecting a norm’s robustness, 
they suggest to study how the two types of norm contestation affect norm robustness 
differently (2018, p. 52). To do so, they make a differentiation between two types of norm 
contestation: either validity contestation or applicatory contestation. The former would 
refer to the validity of the norm being contested, the latter to contestation of the norm’s 
application (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 52). These types of contestation need to 
 
7 Though Antje Wiener speaks of the positive effect of contestation on a norm’s legitimacy, the author 
argues that this does not withstand the possibility of international conflict due to widespread contestation 
(2014, p. 59). 
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be clearly defined before getting into norm robustness, as they are central to the variable 
of norm contestation and, in turn, to this thesis.  
Types of Norm Contestation  
This thesis will rely on the distinction between validity and applicatory contestation. 
These two types need further conceptualisation so that they can be recognised and 
distinguished from each other when they will be applied to the empirical case further on 
in this study. This section will start by taking a closer look at validity contestation, 
examining how this type of contestation is defined, when it occurs, and with what effect, 
followed by a similar examination of applicatory contestation, drawing on the framework 
provided by Zimmermann and Deitelhoff (2018). In the conceptualisation of the different 
types of contestation, this study will moreover touch upon the elements of a norm’s 
structure as described by Winston – referring to a norm’s problem, value, and implied 
behaviour (Winston, 2018, p. 641). 
 Validity contestation  
The first type of contestation is validity contestation. As the name suggests, this type of 
contestation engages with the norm’s validity. The aspect of the norm that is being 
contested is whether the norm is valid – whether it should exist at all. The very core of 
the norm, meaning the basic claims for which it stands, is being challenged (Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann, 2018, pp. 52, 59). Or, through the lens of norm structure – this would relate 
to the primary value of the norm (Winston, 2018, p. 641). Drawing on Deitelhoff and 
Zimmermann’s plea that norm contestation takes place through both discourse and 
actions (2019, p. 6), this thesis suggests that validity contestation, as well as applicatory 
contestation, may be expressed through – for instance – violations, certain voting 
behaviour, arguments in international debates, or in actors’ justifications, all engaging 
with the norm. Yet, as opposed to applicatory contestation, contestation of a norm’s 
validity would take place when the actions or discourse engaging with the norm conflicts 
with, or questions, what the norm stands for. The norm’s legitimacy may be challenged, 
as an actor would argue that its moral standards contradict the norm, or expressing that 
another, conflicting norm should permanently take preference over the contested norm 
(Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 56). Deitelhoff and Zimmermann expect that the 
effects of validity contestation on the norm could be negative – meaning that it has the 
potential to weaken the norm’s robustness. Based on their framework, it is expected that 
a norm’s robustness is more likely to weaken when it faces validity contestation, 
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especially when this contestation is widespread. At the same time, the authors points out 
that even though validity contestation may weaken the norm’s robustness, it does not have 
to (2018, p. 58). Therefore, it will be considered that the contestation of the norm’s 
validity might be very limited, and the effects on the norm’s robustness likewise. 
However, the more widespread and permanent the validity contestation becomes, the 
more negative effects it is expected to have on the norm’s robustness (Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann, 2018, pp. 52, 58). 
To better illustrate how validity contestation takes place, the example of the anti-female 
combatants norm will be used. This norm is based on the premise that a state should not 
use female combatants (Percy, 2019, p. 123).8 Validity contestation of this norm could 
take the form of, for instance, a state rejecting the core of the norm that differentiates 
between men and women. Accordingly, the state could claim that it does not support this 
norm under any circumstances, because the norm would not correspond with the gender 
equality principles it promotes, which would permanently be more important to the state 
than the protection of women through the anti-female combat norm. Discourse at the 
international level, or practices such as the deployment of female combatants, would 
demonstrate that the state does not, or no longer, believes in the legitimacy of the anti-
female combat norm. Validity contestation would thus take place through actions, 
including discourses, of this state that rejects this norm and its core principles as a whole 
(Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, 2019; Percy, 2019). Due to the engagement with and 
contestation of the validity of the anti-female combat norm by this actor, and perhaps 
others, the robustness of this norm is expected to deteriorate.  
In this thesis, the framework of norm contestation and robustness will be applied to the 
norm prohibiting the use of force. Simply put, validity contestation of this norm would 
come in the form of a state rejecting the norm’s premise that states should refrain from 
the use of force against each other to maintain peace in the world order (U.N. Charter, 
1945 art. 2, para. 4). All in all, this means that validity contestation takes place when the 
core and the legitimacy of the norm, its very existence, is being challenged, which 
potentially leads to a decrease in the norm’s robustness (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 
2018, p. 57). This is in contract to applicatory contestation, which challenges how the 
 
8 For more on the contestation and robustness of the anti-female combat norm, see Percy (2019): “What 
Makes a Norm Robust: The Norm Against Female Combat”. 
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norm should be applied, rather than questioning the norm’s existence (Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann, 2018, p. 51).  
 Application contestation 
The second type of norm contestation, besides validity contestation, is applicatory 
contestation. Of these two types of contestation, Deitelhoff and Zimmermann consider 
applicatory contestation to be ‘common practice’, even more so than validity contestation 
(2018, p. 52). This type of contestation can be seen as ‘less severe’, as it does not 
challenge the norm and its existence all together, but rather the norm’s application. The 
aspects of the norm’s application that can be contested, Zimmermann and Deitelhoff 
argue, relate to a given situation, and include the appropriateness of the norm’s 
application under those circumstances; the actions that should be taken accordingly; and 
the importance of the norm in relation to other norms that are applicable (2018, p. 57). 
While this thesis associates the value of the norm structure with validity contestation, the 
other two components of norm structure – behaviour and problem – (Winston, 2018, p. 
641) will be connected to applicatory contestation. Combining this take with Deitelhoff 
and Zimmermann’s framework, this study will understand applicatory contestation to 
take place when actors challenge the behaviour implied by the norm; which 
circumstances or issues trigger the norm, or whether another norm should temporarily 
take priority. States may, for instance, disagree on international forums on which means 
to use to achieve the norm’s core objective. Or a state might contest the norm’s 
application by using the norm slightly different from the way the norm has been 
prescribed or applied previously. A state could, moreover, argue that under certain 
circumstances, the norm should be lifted – that other conflicting norms could be more 
appropriate in a given situation.  
It was previously established that validity contestation is expected to weaken norm 
robustness if it affects it at all. Applicatory contestation, in contrast, is generally expected 
to strengthen norm robustness, yet still has the potential to weaken it under certain 
circumstances (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 58). Firstly, a closer look will be 
taken at how applicatory contestation can lead to the norm strengthening. This study 
expects that the process of meaning-making and engaging with a norm, or the act of norm 
violation, may include or be followed by a debate on the norm and how it should be 
interpreted. According to Barnes, this meaning-making process could revive a debate on 
the norm in which actors can express their support to the norm and meaning-in-use (2016, 
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p. 103). This debate, or even sanctions against violations, may first of all demonstrate that 
norm addressees still consider the norm important and are still committed to it. Moreover, 
it has the potential of providing more clarity, and to a certain extent stabilising the 
meaning of the norm and interpretation (Barnes, 2016, p. 103; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 
2018, pp. 55, 58). In this way, contestation of the norm contestation could include or lead 
to re-commitment to a norm and its meaning-in-use, resulting in the norm becoming more 
robust.  
However, under extraordinary circumstances, applicatory contestation also has the 
potential to impair norm robustness and weaken it. This is possible, according to 
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, “when applicatory contestation becomes permanent, that 
is, if – over a long period – norm addressees cannot achieve renewed consensus or 
compromise on a norm’s meaning and application.” (2018, p. 58). This thus refers to the 
debate mentioned before, yet this time the debate would highlight and – over time – 
strengthen the disagreement on the norm’s meaning-in-use, instead of stabilising it 
(Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 58). This means that if applicatory contestation 
becomes permanent and does not stabilise the norm’s meaning, the robustness of the norm 
is more likely to decrease than increase. Moreover, Deitelhoff and Zimmermann point 
out that such applicatory contestation could lead to the norm’s meaning being obscured 
insofar that violations become difficult to differentiate from compliance (2018, p. 58). 
When applicatory contestation becomes this ‘severe’, it is not always easily distinguished 
from validity contestation, as it might affect the norm’s validity. However, this study will 
look at a one-time event of contestation as part of the independent variable, and only look 
at the norm’s validity over time as part of the independent variable of norm robustness. 
Therefore, whether or not applicatory contestation becomes permanent and so severe that 
it affects the norm’s validity, will not influence the differentiation between validity and 
applicatory contestation in the first section on norm contestation. 
This type of contestation will be applied to the anti-female combat norm as well, drawing 
upon Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s framework. This norm would be considered to face 
applicatory contestation, not validity contestation, in case it is being challenged how the 
norm should be used. For example, states may contest when anti-female combat norm 
applies and when it is lifted. An actor could show resistance to complying with the norm 
in every situation and may argue for certain exceptions – such as wartime, or non-direct 
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combat (Percy, 2019). Moreover, a state might support the anti-female combat norm in 
general, but not how women should be excluded from combat (for instance: promoting 
women’s exclusion from obligatory military service or excluding women from joining 
the army). Another way for a state to contest the norm’s application, could be by 
prioritising other norms. While under validity contestation, the actor would argue that a 
competing norm should permanently be more important than the contested norm, the 
actor contesting the norm’s application would strive for another norm to be prioritised in 
a specific situation. For instance, combatants might have to perform searches on women 
at border checkpoints, leading the state to use female combatants for this task for the 
purpose of cross-cultural awareness (Akers, 2009). In this way, the state would 
temporarily lift, and challenge, the anti-female combat norm, in the name cultural 
sensitivity norms. Such actions could trigger third-party reactions and debate, in which 
other states could express understanding or support of this interpretation of the norm, 
which could lead to a new (partial) consensus or compromise on the norm’s meaning, and 
ultimately strengthen the norm. However, this debate could lead to more disagreement 
and confusion as well. If this contestation and the disagreement on the norm becomes 
permanent, it may become unclear what is a legitimate exception and what is a violation, 
or states might feel less bound by the norm, which in turn could make the norm less robust 
(Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, pp. 57, 58).  
 
All together, this means that applicatory contestation takes place when an actor challenges 
how a norm should be applied, which is expected to strengthen the norm’s robustness as 
it is likely to stabilise a norm’s meaning. However, when this stabilisation does not take 
place and the applicatory contestation becomes permanent, applicatory contestation has 
the potential of weakening norm robustness. For the prohibition of force – the norm that 
will be used in this thesis –, this type of contestation would imply that the application of 
the norm is facing contestation. This means that it is being challenged how states should 
be prohibited from doing so, or when the prohibition would be lifted, instead of whether 
the norm should exist at all. If this study finds the contestation in this case to qualify as 
applicatory, then a closer look needs to be taken at whether or not stabilisation of the 
norm is taken place, and whether this indeed leads to an increase in robustness. To 
establish whether this prediction of Deitelhoff and Zimmermann holds, the robustness of 
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the prohibition of force norm needs to be measured before and after the norm contestation 
takes place.  
Norm Robustness  
Now that norm contestation has been conceptualised and theorised, the concept of norm 
robustness and its dynamics still require further elaboration. As previously described, 
norm change tended to be an understudied field within norm research  (Hoffmann, 2010, 
p. 12; Wiener, 2004, pp. 198–199). Still today, the focus on change specifically in the 
robustness of norms has been lacking (Sandholtz, 2019, p. 139). The few scholars that 
have tried to study a change in the norm strength, have often studied or described norm 
“erosion” (Rosert & Schirmbeck, 2007), “regression” (Barnes, 2016), “cascading” (Fisk 
& Ramos, 2014), or  “death” (Panke & Petersohn, 2016). Yet it was only until Deitelhoff 
and Zimmermann provided a framework, that one could study a change in robustness of 
a norm, that could both increase and decrease (2019).  
The concept of robustness already implies a relation to how strong and solid a certain 
phenomenon is. This thesis will rely on the conceptualisation of norm robustness drawing 
upon Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s framework and on (scholarship on) international and 
customary law. Both consider a norm or a legal custom to contain two elements: the 
facticity/objective element and the validity/subjective one.  
 Facticity  
The first dimensions of robustness – facticity, as formulated by Deitelhoff and 
Zimmermann, considers whether the norm is generally complied with by norm addressees 
(2019, p. 2). This approach, including both elements, originates from a legal perspective 
particularly on what makes a practice an international legal custom. Accordingly, 
unwritten customs are considered to constitute customary law when there is “evidence of 
a general practice accepted as law” (United Nations, Statute on the International Court 
of Justice, 1946, p. 26 art. 38(b)). When this is applied through the framework of 
robustness rather than through a legal lens, a norm would be considered robust when most 
states do not violate the norm but adhere to it (Glennon, 2005, p. 940). Along these lines, 
a robust norm would generally guide state behaviour (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, 
p. 2).  
Some scholars, legal and IR, have focused primarily on practices –  whether or not the 
compliance element of a norm or rule is met (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 6; 
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Glennon, 2005), while others have focused their attention on actors’ belief in norms 
expressed through discourse (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 6; McKeown, 2009; 
Rosert & Schirmbeck, 2007). However, in order to grasp both the facticity and the validity 
as part of the norm’s robustness, practices and discourses engaging with the norm need 
to be taken into account in this thesis in order to study a change in robustness.  
 Validity  
In addition to the facticity and objective elements, there is a second criterion that a custom 
would have to meet to be seen as customary law, and for a norm to be seen as robust. This 
validity dimension relates to whether or not the norm’s claims are widely accepted 
(Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 2), which directly relates to the subjective element 
of international customary law. The latter is referred to as opinion juris in international 
law, a criterion that would be met if states generally believe that they are legally bound 
by the norm (U.N. International Law Commission, A/CN.4/672, 2014, p. 45). Deitelhoff 
and Zimmermann accordingly point out that a norm’s robustness can also be seen in the 
way in which addressees engage with the norm outside of compliance, for instance 
through discourse, that might show states consider the norm to be of high importance 
(2019, pp. 6, 7). Accordingly, it is being argued that norm robustness comes both from 
behaviour consistent with the norm (facticity) and from a general belief in the norm 
(validity) (2019, pp. 1, 8).  
When references are made in this thesis to strengthening or weakening of a norm, it 
implies a change in norm robustness along the dimensions of the facticity and validity. 
Results that demonstrate an increase in validity and facticity of a norm do not indicate 
that a norm is robust per se, they simply indicate an increase in robustness. Norm 
robustness will be applied in this way, rather than aiming to establish a precise level of 
robustness, as norm literature including Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s framework do not 
provide measuring tools or precise levels of robustness that can indicate “how robust a 
norm is’. Instead, Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s framework puts forward four indicators 
along which to study norm robustness: concordance and reactions to norm violations 
(discourse); compliance and implementation (practice) (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 
2019, pp. 2, 3, 6, 8). Simply put, concordance refers to the extent to which states regard 
the norm to be legitimate (2019, p. 8), reactions to responses of third-parties to violations 
of the norm (such as sanctions) (2019, p. 8), compliance to “the level of behaviour 
consistent with the norm” (2019, p. 8), and implementation to the level of “norm inclusion 
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in policy papers, protocols, standards of international and regional organisations, and 
adoption into domestic law.” (2019, p. 8).  
These indicators are provided each with four scales (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 
9). However, the scales are not labelled as high or low or other indications (but simply 
defined by their characteristics), nor is it clear what level they need to have for the norm’s 
validity, facticity, and in turn robustness, to be strengthening or weakening. As explained 
in the methodology chapter, these indicators will be used as guidelines in this study to 
rather than directly applying them, notwithstanding that it will continue to examine both 
the discourse and practice dimensions engaging with the norm to study both the validity 
and facticity that will determine a change in norm robustness.  
In the end, this study is preceded by a constructivist approach that takes norms and their 
meanings to be inherently changing and contested, on which it will draw. The practice of 
norm contestation can predominantly take the form of validity contestation or applicatory 
contestation, and the robustness of the norm may consequently change based on the type 
of contestation it faces. Drawing upon previous norm scholarship and the contestation-
robustness framework from Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, this study aims to reject or 
affirm the following two hypotheses: 
H1: “If the predominant mode of contestation of a norm is applicatory contestation, then 
the norm’s robustness strengthens.” 
H2: “If the predominant mode of contestation of a norm is validity contestation, then the 
norm’s robustness weakens.” 
To ultimately test these expectations – to discover how Russia’s contestation has affected 
the robustness of the prohibition of force norm, a methodological framework will be 








Norm Contestation and Norm Robustness – A Methodological 
Framework  
 
This chapter establishes the methodological considerations of this study. Firstly, the 
choice of research design and the type of case study (theory-confirming) will be justified. 
This is followed by an explanation of the case selection and method of qualitative 
document analysis. As part of the methodological framework, the variables of norm 
contestation and norm robustness will be operationalised. It will then be described how 
the indicators are used to measure the different types of norm contestation – applicatory 
contestation and validity contestation – and the two dimensions of norm robustness – 
facticity and validity. This includes an elaboration upon the data and sources used in the 
analysis to achieve the research aims. 
 
Research Design and Case Selection  
Firstly, the choice of research design will be explained, followed by a closer look at the 
case selection of this qualitative study as well as the timeframe.  
From the different types of studies that can be conducted in the field of social sciences, 
this research will be designed as a single case study. This design, first of all, enables the 
observation of the phenomenon in question in the closest and most direct way possible, 
as opposed to designs with a larger number of cases (Odell, 2001, p. 169). Single case 
studies allow for more depth, especially Type I as defined by Gerring – referring to the 
observation of one unit over time (2004, pp. 343, 348). A Type I case study suits the 
purpose of this research on norm contestation and robustness well, as it would be able to 
study variance of norm robustness over time through this design, rather than studying 
variance between different norms and their robustness as studies focusing on multiple 
units or cases would (Gerring, 2004, p. 347). The aims of this study, in turn, makes the 
research factor-centric, focusing on the effects of X (norm contestation) on Y (norm 
robustness), instead of assessing an explanation for the outcome. Considering this, a case 
study provides a better opportunity to investigate causal mechanisms instead of merely 
causal effects, in comparison to other types and research designs. In the context of norm 
contestation (X) and norm robustness (Y), this would imply that the research does not 
necessarily or only study what the effect of X is on Y, but instead looks into how X affects 
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Y, and through which pattern(s) (Gerring, 2004, p. 348) – meaning, how the process of 
norm contestation affects norm robustness.  
In the end, a single case study allows one to “generate valid theory” or to “refine existing 
theory” (Odell, 2001, pp. 169, 170). This is appropriate, if not necessary, for scholarship 
on norm contestation and robustness, as there is a lack of studies that empirically test the 
only consolidated framework for studying the link between norm contestation and norm 
robustness – the one formulated by Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (Sandholtz, 2019, p. 
139). This lack might relate to the fact that “the type of norm contestation” and “a change 
in norm robustness” are not easily observed in an empirical case, which makes it difficult 
to compare their causal mechanism(s) across cases. This is complicated even more by the 
fact that norm contestation and robustness seem particularly difficult to measure 
‘generally’ or ‘as a whole’. That is to say, before conclusions can be made about how 
norm contestation ‘tends to’ affects robustness, or before several cases of contestation or 
different norms can be compared with one another, the theory of Deitelhoff and 
Zimmermann needs to be tested on a norm. Therefore, a single case study will be a useful 
and the most suitable option to study norm contestation in relation to norm robustness.  
Having established that the most appropriate research design to achieve the objectives of 
this thesis is a single case study, the question arises of what constitutes ‘a case’. As 
Gerring describes a case study as “an in-depth study of a single case unit” (2004, p. 341), 
the unit in question needs to be pointed out. This thesis, accordingly, set out to select and 
study ‘a case of norm contestation’. Based on this objective, the type of case study – 
theory-confirming – and case of contestation – Russia’s contestation in Crimea of the 
prohibition of force (PoF) norm – were selected, which now require further elaboration.  
As there are several ways to perform a case study, it needs to be specified which type of 
case study will be applied and why it was selected. This thesis aims to take the theory and 
framework of Deitelhoff and Zimmermann and test it. A type of case study that 
specifically allows one to do so, is the theory-confirming case study. This type of case 
study offers the “ability to contribute to theory-building” (Odell, 2001, p. 165), which is 
essentially what this study aims to do. The theory-confirming case study particularly fits 
this thesis’ aims for its theory-testing ability. However, it should be noted that this case 
study is ideally applied to a case that is “least-likely” to confirm the theory (Odell, 2001, 
p. 165). It is difficult to determinate whether the case of contestation of the prohibition of 
29 
 
force norm (PoF) by Russia in Crimea constitutes the least-likely case to confirm 
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s theoretical expectations. The likeliness of the theory being 
confirmed or rejected depends greatly on the type of contestation in this case, which 
remains unknow. In terms of what this study can do, rather than what it should ideally 
do, the selected case is remains appropriate for a theory-confirming case study, especially 
considering that the argument for an “extreme case” (Odell, 2001, p. 165) can still be 
made. It is of high significance to this thesis that an extreme case of contestation is 
selected. As mentioned, contestation is considered to be usually present, yet to different 
extents and can accordingly have very limited effects (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, 
p. 52). The theory can only be tested if the independent variable of norm contestation is 
present and therefore has the potential of affecting the dependent variable of norm 
robustness. The reasons for selecting the case study of Russia’s contestation of the PoF 
norm in Crimea will now be further explained.  
The case of the PoF norm being contested by Russia in Crimea suits the aim of this thesis 
– studying norm contestation and robustness – particularly well as it constitutes a clear 
and extreme ‘case of contestation’. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its justifications 
do not need to be closely studied to observe that the PoF norm is being challenged. This 
is demonstrated not only by Russia’s non-compliance at that time, but also by the 
controversy it triggered at the international level (Kress, 2019; UNSC, SC/13344, 2018) 
and the fact that scholars are still talking about it today (Burlyuk, 2021), and therefore 
stands out among other potential cases of norm contestation. It thus provides the 
‘extremeness’ necessary for norm contestation to be visible and have effect, and to 
consequently test the hypotheses. While it offers a clear case of contestation, the type of 
contestation can not be observed without studying Russia’s engagement with the norm 
more closely.  
Russia’s engagement with the PoF norm in the case of Crimea in 2014 is specifically 
chosen over its actions in the Russo-Georgian war (2008) or the Ukrainian crisis as a 
whole. Russia’s actions in Georgia were not regarded as a turning point in the way 
Ukraine was and accordingly faced less controversy (Renz, 2019, p. 191). Along these 
lines, Morozov et al. argue that while “Disagreements over the exact meaning of 
international norms have always stood at the centre of Russia’s relations” with the West, 
the annexation of Crimea symbolised “the real turning point”, since which West primarily 
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perceives Russia’s justifications to be based on lies and “deliberate misinterpretation of 
universal norms” (2018, p. 2). In the end, in comparison to the War in Donbas, there is 
greater availability of discourse and actions in the case of Crimea that allows a proper 
examination of how norms were contested and actions were justified (Bilkova, 2014). 
The case of Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm in Crimea could moreover provide 
useful insights for the discipline of norm research and for the norm in question and the 
debate surrounding it. Firstly, as previously explained, norm contestation literature often 
focuses on liberal-western norms, yet tends to neglect non-liberal-western norms as well 
as the agency of non-western actors to partake in positive change of a norm(‘s robustness) 
(Bloomfield, 2015, p. 314; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 14). The PoF is an 
example of a ‘universal’ norm, as it is codified in the UN Charter. Accordingly, a case 
study of contestation of this norm provides insights into a norm that applies to all states 
and is considered to function in the interest of the international community as a whole, 
rather than simply of states wishing to promote liberal and western norms. Furthermore, 
previous studies have focused on the contestation of norms such as the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) (Acharya, 2013; Badescu & Weiss, 2010; Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 
2018; Jose & Stefes, 2018; Welsh, 2019) and anticipatory self-defence (Brunnée & 
Toope, 2017; DeWeese, 2015; Fisk & Ramos, 2014). These two arguably liberal-western 
norms can be considered as exceptions to or competing with the PoF norm, yet it remains 
unclear what the effects of contestation have been on this universal norm, and it therefore 
needs to be studied through the framework provided by Deitelhoff and Zimmermann. 
The empirical case of the prohibition of force norm, moreover, highlights one of the 
hypotheses among norm and legal scholars that always views norm contestation in a bad 
light – meaning that it is assumed to have a weakening effect on the norm. While some 
norm scholars have referred to the PoF norm as robust (Brunnée & Toope, 2017, p. 2; 
Sandholtz, 2019, p. 142), debates at the international level, for instance at the United 
Nations (UN) show that the PoF norm is perceived as ineffective (UNSC, SC/13344, 
2018) or even “dead” (Kress, 2019) with specific reference to Russia challenging the 
norm. The framework on norm contestation and robustness, however, assumes that norm 
contestation has the potential to weaken but also to strengthen a norm’s robustness. This 
framework needs to be applied to the empirical case of the PoF norm being contested by 
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Russia to see what happened to the norm, and to test whether Russia’s contestation did 
lead to a decrease in the norm’s robustness as echoed in the debate.  
In the end, Russia’s ‘extreme’ contestation in Crimea of the PoF norm provides a good 
opportunity to test the framework of Deitelhoff and Zimmermann and could potentially 
offer insights into contestation by non-western norms and into the PoF norm’s strength. 
This will be done by examining how the independent variable of norm contestation, or 
more specifically the type of contestation, has affected norm robustness – the dependent 
variable. 
A comparison of norm robustness over time is necessary to establish whether contestation 
of the PoF norm was followed by a change in robustness. Russia’s contestation of the 
norm in the first four months of 2014 will be studied to determine which type of 
contestation is taking place, as the annexation of Crimea happened within this timeframe. 
The robustness will accordingly be measured before (t1) and after (t2) the case of 
contestation. Instead of measuring norm robustness at one specific point in time, this 
study will, for several reasons, study the robustness of the PoF norm over the five years 
before and after the contestation. The first reason behind this decision is that simply 
measuring the level of robustness immediately after the contestation does not provide any 
insights on the lasting effects of the contestation on the robustness – as the robustness 
might, for instance, be impaired shortly after the contestation yet not as soon as the 
observed period is extended. Moreover, the level of robustness immediately before 
Russia’s contestation, meaning at the end of 2013, could also be affected by the most 
recent contestation it faced. By examining the average level of robustness over the course 
of five years, a better illustration will be given of the norm’s robustness on the long term. 
Therefore, the level of robustness will be measured from the start of 2009 to the end of 
2013 (t1) and from 2014 until 2018 (t2). 
Qualitative Document Analysis Method 
In order to retrieve the necessary data, this thesis applies the method of qualitative 
document analysis (Karppinen & Moe, 2012). This study will perform an analysis of 
primary sources, resorting mainly to official UN and government documents. This 
method will enable this study to present new and relevant findings rather than 
summarising research literature (Karppinen & Moe, 2012, p. 3). Previous norm 
contestation studies seem to have mixed both literature and documents (Deitelhoff & 
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Zimmermann, 2018; Percy, 2019; Welsh, 2019). However, a thorough analysis of 
primarily UN documents fits the purpose of this study best as it aims to perform a detailed 
empirical case study of a norm that is enshrined in the UN Charter and monitored at the 
UN level, thus being a ‘UN norm’. 
Operationalisation of Norm Contestation  
In order to establish how the IV of norm contestation affects the DV of norm robustness, 
it is necessary to determine what type of contestation is taking place – whether it is 
contesting the norm’s validity, or its application. For the operationalisation of the 
variables, this study draws on the examples of contestation provided by Deitelhoff and 
Zimmermann (2018, pp. 56, 57, 59–71), yet several additions are made to clearly 
distinguish between the two types of contestation.  
 Validity contestation 
The first type of contestation is validity contestation, which is considered to take place 
when contestation of the norm’s validity is being challenged. In practice, this type of 
contestation would occur when the norm’s core claims are being challenged, related to 
the values it stands for. This type of contestation can be observed when, firstly, a state 
claims that the core of the norm is not or no longer in line with its moral standards 
(Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 56). In this way, the actor directly opposes the 
values that norm stands for, and it does not wish to be associated with the norm. The 
second indicator of this type of contestation can be observed when a state demonstrates 
its belief that a competing norm should fully take preference (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 
2018, p. 56), meaning that the state expresses that the contested norm should permanently 
be replaced or become irrelevant. This study will moreover consider any other practices 
that attack the norm’s validity if they may arise.  
Validity contestation can be observed in both discourse as action, together referred to as 
practices engaging with the norm. An example along the lines of the first indicator can be 
seen in the case of Turkey pulling out of the Istanbul Convention. The state would be 
contesting the norm that aims to combat violence against women, on the grounds that 
Turkey did not want to participate in “attempts to normalise homosexuality” (President 
Erdoğan, 2021). This can be interpreted as Turkey claiming that the norm against gender-
based violence could not be supported based on the country’s moral beliefs concerning 
sexuality and family values. The practice of contestation would include both the act of 
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withdrawal and Turkey’s justification. The second indicator on competing norms could, 
for instance, be observed when a state advocates against or breaches international privacy 
norms as it believes that the government’s right to surveillance should be prioritised at all 
times. 
 Applicatory contestation  
The contestation of a norm’s application, in turn, is considered to take place when an 
actor challenges how the norm should be applied. This second type of contestation is 
more common than validity contestation, according to Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 
(2018, p. 57). Applicatory contestation can be observed when the contestation does not 
concern whether or not a norm is valid, but it contests the way in which to apply the norm. 
This can be indicated, firstly, by a state challenging which behaviour is implied by the 
norm (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 57). A norm’s core might indicate its values 
and aims, yet not necessarily how to uphold that value or achieve that goal (Winston, 
2018, p. 641). A state could contest the norm’s application by interpreting or using the 
norm in a (slightly) different way than its meaning-in-use (Wiener, 2009, p. 179). 
Secondly, this type of contestation may be expressed through practices that question when 
the norm should be applied – in which circumstances the norm applies and when it does 
not (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 57). This study understands this circumstantial 
indicator to include practices that contest which problems may trigger either a norm to 
apply (Winston, 2018, p. 641), or the norm to be lifted. The latter would allow prohibitive 
norms to be studied including exceptions to the norm – situations in which it would not 
apply are part of the norm’s application that can be challenged. Closely related is the third 
indicator that is visible when other competing norms are claimed to take priority 
temporarily (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 57). A given situation would allow the 
norm to be replaced by another norm. This indicator can be distinguished from the 
competing norms indicator of validity contestation, as the latter takes place when another 
norm is permanently prioritised over the contested norm, while applicatory contestation 
occurs when a specific situation would, according to an actor, allow for another norm to 
be prioritised for a certain period of time. However, this study likes to draw attention to 
the fact that a norm’s core might already include exceptions. This study will not consider 
the lawful use of a norm’s exceptions as contestation. Yet when the use and interpretation 
of these exceptions are being debated, or when they are breached or challenged in any 
way different from how the norm’s exception are implied or intended, it will be 
34 
 
considered as applicatory contestation. In the end, this study believes applicatory 
contestation to be observed through practices that challenge the behaviour implied by the 
norm; which circumstances or problems trigger action or inaction; or whether competing 
norms should take preference in a given situation, as well as any other practices that imply 
the norm to be used or interpreted different from its meaning-in-use (Wiener, 2009, p. 
179).  
The first indicator – contestation of the behaviour that the norm implies – is expected by 
this study to be rather common, as norms tend to be guidelines rather than giving specific 
instructions. An example can be provided by a norm that promotes states to cut their CO2 
emissions. States could meet at international for a or conventions debating this norm. If 
states were to disagree on the way to achieve this norm’s objective, or if a state would 
diverge from the implied behaviour, the norm’s application is considered to be contested. 
Secondly, the circumstantial indicator could be illustrated by the anti-discrimination 
norm. A state may believe that discrimination based on someone’s age, for instance, is 
not acceptable, except when a situation requires ‘positive discrimination’ as it would 
when aiming to meet a quota, thus challenging the exceptions to the norm based on the 
specific circumstances. The third indicator concerning competing norms could also be 
related to the anti-discrimination norm as it could be prioritised over the freedom of 
speech norm. A state may accept the validity of the freedom of speech norm, but may 
believe that, or question if, a case of supposed discrimination, the anti-discrimination 
norm should take the upper hand. All these examples are contesting how and when the 
norm should be applied and where its limits lay.  
It is important to take into account that the independent variable of norm contestation is, 
in a way, conditional. In the way Deitelhoff and Zimmerman formulated the phenomenon, 
contestation as a whole does not weaken or strengthen norm robustness in general, but 
under certain conditions. While validity contestation almost always makes it more likely 
for robustness to weaken, applicatory contestation could – rarely but possibly – weaken 
norm robustness under the condition that the contestation becomes permanent, while it 
could strengthen the norm in case the contestation stabiles the norm’s meaning. However, 
the “becoming permanent” factor is not a separate conditional variable by itself 
(Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 58; Van Evera, 1997) and it does not have to be for 
this thesis, as it only investigates a single instance of contestation.  
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In the end, the independent variable of norm contestation can be understood as being 
expressed either through validity contestation or through applicatory contestation. The 
indicators can be used to determine which type of contestation is taking place. In order to 
ascribe one or the other to the case in question, the contestation of the prohibition of force 
norm by Russia in Crimea needs to be closely analysed. Official documents from the UN, 
primarily its Security Council, and from the Russian Federation will be examined. This 
thesis does not aim to analyse Russia’s practices in Crimea in 2014 in the context of 
legality, or how Russia broke its agreements with Ukraine. This study instead wishes to 
analyse how Russia engaged with and contested the PoF norm, rather than establishing if 
it legally violated the norm the norm or not. This case was selected because norm 
contestation is visible, not because Russia would have clearly violated the PoF norm. 
Violation of the norm will at the same time not be fully disregarded, as the act of violation 
as well as its justifications are still considered to be part of norm contestation in this thesis, 
even when it is not clear whether these practices were officially lawful or not. 
Accordingly, the sources will be selected based on the criteria that they provide an 
account of the actions taken by Russia that contest the PoF norm and the justifications for 
them, including allegations and reports from other states. The possibility of resorting to 
secondary sources is not excluded, as they enable a better grasp the facts on the grounds 
as well when language issues arise. 
The possibility that cases of Russia engaging with the PoF norm in Crimea have gone 
unreported should not be excluded. For the purpose of this thesis, only the practices on 
paper will be examined – meaning those that Russia has accounted for as well as those 
discussed at the UN level. This study does not expect unreported instances to be the most 
significant contestation faced by this norm. As mentioned, these practices are not limited 
to legal violations of the norm but can include references to the use of force and the 
prohibition of it. References to other practices and allegations will also be considered, 
such as “occupation”, (armed) “intervention”, “annexation” and “act of aggression”. Even 
if these practices are not proven to have occurred in combination with the use of force, 
they can all be considered to refer directly to the norm, as well as at least implying the 
threat to use force – which is also prohibited by the PoF as described in Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter. Therefore, Russia’s practices – which include its actions and 
justifications – engaging with and related to the PoF norm will be demonstrated and 
defined to subsequently classify it as either validity or applicatory contestation.  
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By first analysing Russia’s actions followed by Russia’s discourse contesting the norm, 
this study will ascribe either the type of validity contestation or applicatory contestation 
as the most prominent mode of contestation by Russia. Once the type of contestation is 
established, it will be expected that the norm’s robustness strengthens if primarily 
applicatory contestation took place and that it weakens if primarily validity contestation 
took place (as illustrated in Figure 1). To test whether the type of contestation led to a 
change in the norm’s robustness, the robustness of the norm needs to be examined before 
and after the contestation.  
 
Figure 1. Types of Norm Contestation (IV) and Effects on Norm Robustness (DV). 
 
Operationalisation of Norm Robustness  
The dependent variable of norm robustness exists of two dimensions – facticity and 
validity. For a norm’s robustness to be considered ‘high’, both the norm’s facticity and 
validity need to be high (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 2). The primary objective 
of this thesis is not to measure exact levels of robustness, as it believes that this is not 
objectively possible. Rather, it aims to observe whether or how a norm’s robustness 
changes because of norm contestation. To observe a change, this study works with levels 
of robustness and its dimensions. Both dimensions can be ordinally ranked from 
low/moderately low/medium/moderately high/high, and the overall robustness will be 
taken as an ‘average’. For instance, if at a moment in time the norm’s facticity is 
considered to be medium while its validity is considered to be high – the norm’s overall 
robustness will be moderately high. The option of variation within one level will be taken 
into account – both facticity and validity can be at a medium level, with one being closer 
to moderately low and the other closer to moderately high. A bar of robustness levels was 
created (see Figure 2) to address this variation and to increase the level of precision. The 
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levels of facticity and validity will be indicated on this bar, as well as the level of 
robustness.  
 
Figure 2. Levels of Robustness. 
 
While this method is primarily used to observe a change in robustness rather than 
determining whether the norm in question is robust or not, the findings of this study may 
give an indication of how robust the norm is a given moment. For instance, a norm can 
be ascribed the label of robust according to this method if it at least meets the moderately 
high level. In order to study the level of robustness and accordingly a change in 
robustness, the levels of its facticity and validity dimensions need to be established.  
This study’s indicators will draw upon – yet deviate from – the four indicators proposed 
by Deitelhoff and Zimmermann: compliance, implementation, concordance, and third-
party reactions (2019, p. 8). These indicators do not seem to be applicable to all norms 
and all cases of contestation, including the contestation of the prohibition of force norm. 
The implementation indicator, for instance, is meant to measure the level to which the 
norm is implemented at the national level, and in particular in domestic law. Moreover, 
the number of ratifications and opt-outs to the norm is part of the concordance indicator 
(Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 8). These aspects would not be relevant nor 
applicable to the PoF norm, considering that the prohibition of force between different 
states is codified into international law and applies to all states in the international realm 
(U.N. Charter, 1945 art. 2, para. 4). Deitelhoff and Zimmermann do furthermore not state 
which indicators are meant to measure validity and which ones are to measure facticity 
(2019). This thesis, in turn, will still rely on the compliance indicator to observe facticity, 
while trying to observe the norm’s general acceptance relying on the indicator concerning 
third-party reactions to violations and the concordance-indicator.  
 Facticity 
The first dimension of norm robustness relates to how well the norm is guiding states’ 
actions – how well states adhere to the norm (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 2; 
Glennon, 2005, p. 940). The level of facticity is indicated by compliance, an indicator 
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that can be described by Deitelhoff and Zimmermann as “behaviour consistent with 
norms” (2019, p. 8). To measure the facticity dimension, this study will primarily rely on 
primary sources from the UNSC.  
This data will be retrieved from the yearly repertoires of the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) covering case studies related to the UN’s primary principles – including the 
prohibition of force (UNSC, 2020). The analysis of documents for the facticity dimension 
includes a quantitative element, as the level of compliance will be based on the number 
of different cases that engaged with and invoked the PoF norm (specifically article 2 
paragraph 4 of the UN Charter) due to (alleged) cases of violation or non-compliance. 
This information will be retrieved from the yearly and bi-yearly UN reports listing all 
instances in which Article 2(4) was used in a decision, cited, or invoked in debate (UNSC, 
2020). Based on these documents, this study will determine how many different cases led 
to a UN response or debate based on or invoking the norm. These references to the norm 
will be studied with the objective to observe how often there are instances of questionable 
behaviour, regardless of whether this is officially labelled as a violation or not. Even 
though violations in this thesis are considered part of norm contestation as well as an 
indicator of low(er) facticity, it is not an objective of this study to determine whether 
specific behaviour legally counts as a violation of the norm or not. Rather, this study 
centres around norms being contested, and facticity in particular concerns the level to 
which the norm being adhered to. Especially considering the political aspect of whether 
the UNSC labels an action as a breach, considering the veto power of specific states, this 
study will still consider the facticity to decrease even when there are many alleged 
violations of the norm. Therefore, not only the cases in which the UN  underlines or 
reaffirms the importance of Article 2(4) are examined, but also the constitutional 
discussions and invocations in communications of the norm (UNSC, 2020). By including 
the invocation of the norm, this study takes into account that not all breaches of the norm 
are labelled or condemned as a violation by the UN. 
Cases are included on the criteria that they explicitly refer to Article 2(4), excluding 
implicit references mentioned in the documents, such as calling upon ‘good 
neighbourliness’. Moreover, these cases that are counted as ‘non-compliance’ when they 
relate to the use of force by one state against another, rather than a state against its citizens, 
or including terrorist organisations. If the same instance of an alleged breach of the norm 
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leads to multiple invocations by different states, the ‘case of non-compliance’ will only 
be counted once under the period of review.  
The facticity of the norm will be scanned on the basis of five years prior to the contestation 
and the five years after. The following numbers are based on two considerations. The first 
is the amount of times in which an article similar to Article 2(4) was invoked – namely 
Article 39 on that concerns threats to and breaches of peace, as well as acts of aggression 
(U.N. Charter, 1945 art. 39). The second consideration was established by examining 
other years outside of the scope of this study and the number of times that Article 2(4) 
was invoked there. This examination showed that both articles had approximately five 
different cases of alleged non-compliance a year. Therefore, only two invocations of 
Article 2(4) for the period under review is considered to be a high level of compliance, 
while five invocations are seen as average. 
This study will examine the compliance and accordingly the facticity of the norm twice 
over the course of five years each. Accordingly, if there are up to 10 cases in five years 
time, the general compliance with the norm and the facticity accordingly will be 
considered high. In turn, when there are up to 20 invocations of the norm in different 
cases, the norm’s facticity will be considered moderately high. The border between 
moderately high and medium is 20. When this occurs up to 21 to 30 times, the facticity 
will be at medium level. The facticity will be moderately low when the norm is invoked 
up to 40 times, with the lowest level being when Article 2(4) is used in more than 40 
different instances.  
 Validity 
The second dimension of norm robustness relates to norm addressees’ general belief in 
the norm’s claims (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 2). Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 
suggest to apply the third-party reactions and concordance indicators to study discourse 
on the norm (2019, p. 8). While this thesis will examine norm discourse to measure 
validity, it will merge these two indicators into one indicator of general acceptance. This 
is, first of all, because the concordance-indicator by itself already equals “general belief 
in the norm’s claims” (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019, p. 2). Secondly, most debates 
on prohibitive norms seem to consist of third-party reactions to violations or questionable 
behaviour concerning the norm, as such an event would lead to this issue being discussed 
at the UN level. However, as opposed to the facticity dimension, the validity dimension 
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includes general UN meetings and is not limited to debates after (alleged) violations, nor 
does it accumulate the number of cases of non-compliance or of condemnations. This is 
because an increase in condemnation can be caused due to an increase of violations, which 
would not by itself signify an increase in validity in this study. Instead, this study will 
examine the references made in third-party reactions to violations and in discourse on the 
norm in general over the course of five years, to see how the norm was discussed.  
The discourses used in this study rely once more primarily on UN documents and meeting 
coverage. The general acceptance indicator will observe how the PoF norm is discussed, 
rather than how often. This study also resorts to coverage at the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) and to several government-issued documents and statements that 
make reference to the PoF norm. Drawing upon Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s definition 
of concordance, the general belief in the norm is considered to include a belief in the 
legitimacy of the institution monitoring the norm (2019, p. 8), which in this case would 
be the UN. They moreover implied that as a consequence of contestation, the norm’s 
meaning may stabilise (2018, p. 57). Therefore, the indicator of general acceptance will 
include the level of acceptance of a specific meaning-in-use of the norm.  
Along these lines, the norm’s general acceptance and, in turn, its validity are considered 
to be high when nearly all references to the norm in discourses emphasise a strong belief 
in the significance of the norm’s existence, as well as belief in the UN, and acceptance of 
how the norm should be interpreted. The level of validity becomes moderately high when 
the majority of references to the norm highlight the importance of the norm; when the 
UN’s legitimacy is slightly questioned, and the norm’s meaning-in-use might be debated. 
The norm’s validity will reach the medium level when approximately half of the states’ 
references to the norm to not demonstrate a belief in the norm’s legitimacy; there is a lack 
of respect towards the UN and there is no consensus on the norm’s meaning. A 
moderately low level will be attributed when the discourse generally does not necessarily 
demonstrate that states believe in the validity of the UN nor of the norm, which does not 
imply a common understanding. Ultimately, the norm’s validity is perceived as low in 
this study when the data demonstrates no acceptance of the norm’s general claims at all; 
of a meaning-in-use, nor of the UN’s legitimacy. These different levels allow an 
observation of a change in robustness before and after the contestation, which now will 
be applied to Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm.  
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Analysis: Case study of Russia & the Prohibition of Force Norm  
 
In this chapter, a case study will be conducted on the Prohibition of Force (PoF) norm 
on the basis of the theoretical and methodological frameworks previously presented. An 
analysis of the contestation and robustness of the PoF norm will provide an answer to 
the research question and test the hypothesis. The chapter exists of two parts, the first 
focusing on norm contestation and the second on norm robustness. The part focusing on 
contestation will first describe the core of the PoF norm, to thereafter establish if the 
norm’s core and validity was contested, or its application. After an examination of 
Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm both through actions and discourse will lead one 
to determine whether the contestation in this context is predominantly applicatory or 
validity contestation. Secondly, the robustness of the PoF norm will be measured before 
(t1) and after (t2) the annexation of Crimea, by measuring the norm’s facticity and 
validity at both points in time. This chapter will ultimately provide insights into the effects 
of contestation on norm robustness in the case of Russia contesting the PoF norm.  
Russia’s Contestation of the Prohibition of Force Norm 
The first section of this chapter aims to determine whether the international norm 
prohibiting the use of force is facing contestation of its application or its validity by 
Russia in Crimea. As illustrated in the chapter on the theoretical framework, this study 
considers contestation in general – not one specific type – to take place through practices 
that engage with and challenge a norm and its meaning-in-use, either wholly or partially.9 
A norm can be contested, for instance, by using the norm in a non-traditional manner; by 
violating it; by discussing the norm at international forums. Such practices are expected 
to affect the robustness of the norm – strengthen it or weaken it – based on whether these 
practices are contesting the norm’s core claims (validity), or merely contesting how the 
norm should be used (applicatory) (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 51).10 The type 
of contestation that the PoF norm is facing first needs to be established to test if either 
applicatory or validity contestation affects norm robustness as theorised. Firstly, a closer 
look needs to be taken at the core of the PoF norm as well as the practices of Russia in 
 
9 More details about the conceptualisation of norm contestation in this thesis can be found on page 15. 
10 The differences between applicatory and validity contestation are described in detail starting page 19. 
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Crimea that engaged with the PoF to see whether or not the core of the PoF norm was 
challenged – whether it was facing validity or applicatory contestation.  
The Core of the Prohibition of Force Norm  
An important distinction between validity and applicatory contestation is whether the core 
of the norm is challenged or not. Drawing on Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, who refer to 
the norm’s core as its “basic claims” (2018, p. 59), the core of a norm in this thesis is 
understood as the primary principle or value the norm stands for. Applying this to the 
case in question, knowledge on the core of the PoF norm should be obtained so that 
practices contesting this core can be identified. 
The PoF norm, as the name indicates, intends to prohibit states from using force against 
one another (U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4). Before this norm was codified by the United 
Nations (UN), it was visible in history as a primarily moral doctrine (Sayapin & 
Tsybulenko, 2018, p. 4). States’ desire to renounce the use of force, except in the case of 
self-defence, was strongly expressed after World War I (General Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War, 1928; The Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919), establishing 
the non-use of force as a customary rule (Bilkova, 2015, pp. 30, 31; Sayapin & 
Tsybulenko, 2018, p. 4). After the Second World War, however, states deemed their 
desire to maintain peace, and the custom prohibiting force, in need of being enforced and 
codified, resulting in the establishment of the United Nations (UN) and its Charter. After 
listing the UN’s purposes and objectives (U.N. Charter, art. 1), Article 2, paragraph 4 of 
the Charter formulates the prohibition of force as follows:  
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” (U.N. Charter, p. 3 art. 2, 
para. 4). 
International law thus prohibits states from using – or merely threatening to use – force 
against another state. As the norm is asking states to refrain from specific behaviour; 
requiring in-action, the PoF norm would qualify as a “negative duty” as described 
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann (2018, p. 57). There are, however, exceptions to this 
prohibition, as listed in the Charter. The prohibition of force could be lifted, for instance 
when collective action is authorised by the Security Council (UNSC) (U.N. Charter, art. 
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39), or in the case of individual or collective self-defence after an armed attack (U.N. 
Charter, art. 51). A question that arises, in turn, is which practices count as the use of 
‘force’ or as an ‘armed attack’. When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) addressed 
this issue in 1986, an armed attack was defined to include acts of armed force against 
another state or across nationals borders by regular armed forces, as are other armed 
groups sent by another state, excluding the mere support of rebel groups by for instance 
providing weapons or logistics (Judgement Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986 
para. 195, p.93, 94). However, the definition of an armed attack and the threat to an armed 
attack is still, or again an issue of discussion in the contemporary world (DeWeese, 2015, 
p. 84; Upeniece, 2018, p. 2), as will become more clear further on.  
Since the UN was established with the main purpose to maintain peace and prevent any 
threats to peace, the prohibition of the use of force can be considered as one of the most 
important legal provisions, if not the most important, of the Charter as a whole. 
Accordingly, the PoF is often referred to as a jus cogens norm, a norm of peremptory 
status, though it has its derogations and limitations that could make the norm ineligible 
for this status (Akande, 2019; Green, 2011; Sayapin & Tsybulenko, 2018, p. 15).11 Based 
on the legal character of the norm, one may say that the core of the PoF norm embodies 
the belief that states should not use force against each other. The norm symbolises ideals 
of peace – preserving peace by preventing interstate violence.  
However, there is more to a norm and its core than its existence in code – as outlined 
before in terms of customary law. Regardless of what is written down, a norm might be 
used and interpreted differently. Without going into the details of the facticity and validity 
of the PoF norm (which will be discussed in this chapter’s section on robustness), it is 
important to touch upon the norm outside of its legal character. This is because a state 
showing behaviour that is inconsistent or non-compliant with the norm in legal terms, 
might not be contesting the norm as much as it seems if the general practice of states 
engaging with the norm’s meaning-in-use was already deviating from the legal obligation. 
Looking at practices engaging with the PoF norm in the last two decades, it may be 
 
11 The criteria for a norm to be jus cogens are the following: “(a) it is a norm of general international law; 
and (b) it is accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 




noticed that inter-state force has been used without being legitimised by the exceptions 
to the norm – meaning without UNSC authorisation, and, arguably, without falling under 
self-defence. The norm has been challenged on several occasions, for instance through 
‘humanitarian interventions’ and ‘preventive wars’ (or anticipatory self-defence). The 
former being, for instance, NATO’s intervention in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) in 1999 (O’Connell, 2010), and the latter the Iraq War starting in 2003 as part of 
the U.S. ‘War on Terror’ (Hinnebusch, 2007; Rigstad, 2007). Both these instances were 
followed by debates on the legitimacy of humanitarian and preventative reasoning as 
exceptions to the PoF norm.  
The debate that took place after the invasion of Iraq initiated by the United States in 2003, 
however, demonstrated that it was mainly the US that advocated for this exception to the 
PoF norm (BBC, 2003). In 2003, the UN Disarmament Commission meeting called for a 
“world order based on effective arms control and the rejection of unilateral use of force” 
(U.N. Disarmament Commission, DC/2860, 2003). During this meeting, several states 
rendered the notion of pre-emptive self-defence unnecessary or even dangerous (Roberts, 
2009, p. 200; United Nations, DC/2860, 2003), which would refer self-defence without 
having suffered an attack. Furthermore, in the same year, the then UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan stated:  “No principle of the Charter is more important than the principle of 
the non-use of force as embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4.” (Wood, 2013, p. 345). 
However, despite the use of force without meeting the norm’s legal exceptions, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not once in any of its decisions found that a state 
resorted to “an act of aggression” (Akande & Tzanakopoulus, 2017, p. 1; D’Alessandra, 
2017, p. 10; International Court of Justice, 2021). 
Recent developments show that the prohibition of force norm, despite its arguably 
peremptory status, occasionally faces non-compliance without legal repercussions. 
Contemporary justifications of the states not adhering to the norm, often include a 
humanitarian element – using humanitarian intervention and hinting at the so-called 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to rationalise exceptions to the norm beyond those 
provided by the norm itself (Dorr, 2008; Finnemore, 2003; O’Connell, 2010).12 Through 
 
12 Such justifications in the absence of UNSC authorisation or outside of the UNSC’s mandate can for 
example be seen in the cases of NATO’s intervention in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (O’Connell, 




this reasoning, states tend to argue for the protection of ‘strangers’ rather than their own 
citizens (Wheeler, 2003), and calling upon the ‘self-determination of the people’ when 
the state under attack opposes the use of force (Bilkova, 2015, p. 43; Finnemore, 2003, p. 
72). While the support for the R2P notion has been expressed by states at the UN level  
(UNGA, A/RES/60/1, 2005; U.N. News, 2013; Welsh, 2019), this notion tends to be used 
in cases where states circumvented UNSC authorisation. As Bilkova pointed out:  
“the right to use force in a unilateral way, without the authorisation of the UN Security 
Council, to prevent or stop massive violations of human rights in a foreign country has 
never been generally accepted.” (2015, p. 48). 
Other justifications that have been used by states to resort to force have directly or 
indirectly referred to self-defence, without meeting the legal criteria.13 Even though 
Article 51 of the UN Charter explicitly mentions that states have the right to resort to self-
defence by using force in case they have suffered an armed attack (U.N. Charter, art. 51), 
states have resorted to pre-emptive and arguably even preventive self-defence (Fisk & 
Ramos, 2014; O’Connell, 2002, p. 2 note 10; Rigstad, 2007, p. 17)14. What qualifies as 
an attack remains debated (DeWeese, 2015, p. 84; Upeniece, 2018, p. 2) and seems to 
contribute to the ambiguities that the PoF norm was already facing, as what constitutes 
‘the use of force’ is not as clear anymore as it was in 1945. Modern warfare, including 
hybrid and cyber warfare, as well as humanitarian considerations, seem to have 
implications for the PoF norm (DeWeese, 2015; Lantis & Bloomberg, 2018) – affecting 
states’ beliefs on when they would be bound by the norm, and affecting their practices 
engaging with it.  
What is important to take away from the way in which states have engaged with the norm, 
is these actions clearly challenged the PoF norm, primarily its application. States have 
contested the meaning-in-use of the norm’s application – which issues would trigger the 
norm and which behaviour should be used in certain situations such as humanitarian 
crises or in the case of an anticipated attack. This study, however, does not consider these 
 
13 See the examples of the Bush Doctrine during the US War on Terror, specifically the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 (Rigstad, 2007), or the strikes against Syria in 2018 initiated by the US (Schmitt & Ford, 2017).   
14 Pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence can be understood as the use of force in anticipation of an 
attack that the state knows will happen, it simply does not know when. Preventive self-defence, in turn, 
would take place when the state uses force against a non-imminent threat, meaning that it does not know 
if it will take place. These two types of self-defence can nevertheless be difficult to distinguish (DeWeese, 
2015, pp. 85, 86, 90).  
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issues that were challenged to belong to the core of the PoF. In general, these practices 
do not question the core claim that states should refrain from using force. Rather, it 
challenged when the prohibition and its exceptions apply, adding additional conditions 
for the legitimate use of force outside of those conditions provided by the norm itself. 
Challenges of the norm’s application are not considered part of the norm’s core by this 
study. However, it should not be disregarded that such applicatory contestation could and 
may have affected the norm’s validity eventually. In other words, if states often challenge 
when the prohibition of force applies, the norm may not be taken serious anymore and its 
legitimacy may be doubted. A thorough analysis of the norm’s validity and facticity as 
part of its robustness will be analysed later on. First, it should be noted that this previous 
contestation may have affected the norm’s meaning-in-use. The norm’s core claims that 
the prohibition of force is nearly absolute, considering its peremptory status and only two 
legal exceptions. In practice, the norm often seems to represent the notion that “states 
should be prohibited from using force, except…”, thus going beyond its legal exceptions 
and therefore interpreting the norm to be more conditional than the norm itself claims to 
be.  
To sum up, the core of the PoF norm exists of the belief that states should refrain from 
using force against each other. If this core claim is challenged, validity contestation is 
considered to take place. If other aspects of the norm are being challenged outside of its 
core, for instance how and when to apply the norm – including its exceptions, applicatory 
contestation is taking place. It now needs to be determined whether Russia was contesting 
the norm’s application in Crimea, or whether it contested the validity of core of the PoF 
norm.  
Russia’s Practices contesting the Prohibition of Force Norm  
This study now precedes to present how Russia contested the PoF in the first four months 
of 2014 through its practices – referring both to the actions it took as well as the discourse 
it used to justify these actions. These include Russia’s appeal to and approval from its 
Federation Council to use force; Russia’s acts using force through the deployment of 
military units on the ground and the ‘little green men’; and Russia’s veto to the draft 
resolution based on Article 2(4). Accordingly, it will be established which type of 
contestation was predominant.  
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The first way in which Russia engaged with the PoF norm, was through President Putin’s 
request to use force in Crimea, which was approved by the Russian Federation Council 
(the parliament’s upper chamber) on the 1st of March (Federation Council Res. 48-SF, 
2014). Officially, the authorisation did not end up being used and was cancelled 
(Federation Council Res. No. 296-SF, 2014). However, the fact that the permission was 
not officially practiced does not mean that this appeal did not contest the norm prohibition 
of force norm. The practice of contestation here is not the potential use of force, but the 
appeal to do so, as well as its authorisation. The request by itself already demonstrates 
the intent and willingness of President Putin to use armed force in Crimea, regardless of 
whether this was already happening or not. Secondly, Putin did not request the 
authorisation from the UNSC that is necessary for the prohibition of force to be lifted, 
and instead regarded permission from its own Federation Council to suffice.15  
Before going into the justification provided by Russia, these specific actions are by 
themselves already contesting the PoF norm. Even if the request would not been 
approved, asking for permission for military action sends a signal. This study considers 
these practices to at least constitute a threat to use force, which is also prohibited by the 
norm (U.N. Charter, 1945 art. 2, para. 4). Moreover, the fact that Russia did not request 
authorisation from the UNSC is not surprising (due to other states veto power) yet can 
still be considered as contesting the need to request UNSC authorisation to resort to force. 
Together, these practices by themselves (without justification) are taken to be challenging 
the norm partially – the part that prohibits the threat to use force and the part that requires 
UNSC authorisation.  
However, the challenged posed to the norm by these practices are taken to be limited. 
While it can be said that, first of all, this ‘threat’ is prohibited by the norm’s core, a breach 
of what is prohibited by the norm’s core is not automatically attributed to validity 
contestation. Instead, this practice is taken to be contesting a part of the norm to a rather 
limited extent. Simply a countries’ willingness to use force is not considered to be 
challenging the PoF much, or its validity. The practice of circumventing the UNSC, in 
turn, is a way in which the PoF has often been contested, as previously explained. These 
 
15 According to the Russian Constitution, the Federation Council has the authority to (among others) 
“decide on the possibility of using the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the territory of the 




past practices have been taken as applicatory contestation since they challenge when the 
norm applies, and which behaviour is implied. Russia’s practices can also be considered 
as such, as they challenge if Russia may resort to force when it does not have UNSC 
authorisation, or whether the action of requesting it is part of the behaviour implied by 
the PoF norm. However, in contrast to those past practice of applicatory contestation, 
Russia did not officially act upon this request to use force, and it can therefore be seen as 
a ‘less severe’ version of the applicatory contestation that the norm commonly faces. 
Therefore, this study takes the acts of requesting and approving the use of force by Russia 
as ‘lightly’ contesting the norm’s application.  
Russia’s justifications, as provided in the adoption of the Federation Council’s decision, 
demonstrate how the state contested the PoF norm through discourse. The decision 
justified the authorisation of the use of force for “the interest and safety of the lives of 
citizens of the Russian Federation, our compatriots and the personnel of the military 
contingent of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (Bilkova, 2015, p. 38; 
Federation Council Res. 48-SF, 2014). This justification can be understood, firstly, as 
Russia speaking in the language of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), legitimatising its 
need to intervene based on the urgency to protect he people of Crimea. Another way to 
interpret this statement is in the light of anticipatory self-defence, as it does not only 
mention Russia’s forces (that already would have been there under agreement with 
Ukraine) but also the people of Russia, notwithstanding that ‘Crimean compatriots’ may 
be included in the latter from Putin’s perspective (TASS, 2014).  
Accordingly, by the means of these justifications, Russia is challenging legitimate 
exceptions to the norm. As previously explained in more detail, the norm itself only 
allows for the prohibition to be lifted only when authorised by the UNSC or when a state 
has suffered from an armed attack (U.N. Charter, 1945 art. 39, art. 51). However, in 
practice, states have been applying both the R2P and pre-emptive self-defence as 
justifications for their non-adherence to the PoF norm. Similarly, the application of such 
reasoning used by Russia contests which circumstances trigger the norm to be lifted – 
such as the alleged endangerment of lives. It moreover implies that competing ideals – 
again referring to the protection of the people in the territory of Crimea – should in the 
given situation gain priority over upholding prohibition of force. Along the lines of 
applicatory contestation’s indicators, Russia is contesting when the norm should be 
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applied, which problems allow for deviating behaviour, and using competing norms that 
should temporarily take over. The statement does not indicate that the other norms should 
permanently be prioritised, nor does it challenge the legitimacy of the norm’s core.  Based 
on this, Russia’s discourse engaging with the norm through the request and approval of 
the use of force on the 1st of March, are taken to be applicatory contestation rather than 
validity contestation. This is similar to the previous creation and promotion of conditions 
under which the use of force could be authorised in the absence of the conditions legally 
legitimising the use of force. Yet, in this particular instance Russia did not act upon this 
authorisation, and these practices are accordingly not perceived as a severe form of 
applicatory contestation.   
It is important to note that even though Russia did not officially use this authorisation 
(Federation Council Res. No. 296-SF, 2014); even though it had forces deployed in 
Crimea under agreement with Ukraine (Federation Council Res. 48-SF, 2014), there have 
still been reports of “the deployment of additional Russian troops” (UNSC, S/PV.7124, 
2014, p. 2). This was stated by the then Deputy Secretary-General of the UN during the 
UNSC meeting on the 1st of March (UNSC, S/PV.7124, 2014) following the Russian 
Federation Council’s decision and the earlier request of Ukraine’s representative to the 
UN to have an urgent meeting on the situation in Crimea (UNSC, S/2014/136, 2014). The 
other instances in which Russia did reportedly use force are also taken to be contesting 
the norm.  
After that, Russia’s engagement with the norm become more direct and noticeable. Russia 
has reportedly used force by through the military units already on the ground as 
previously described (UNSC, S/PV.7124, 2014), as well as through the so-called ‘little 
green men’ (UNSC, SC/11319, 2014; S/PV.7125, 2014; S/PV.7134, 2014). On the 3rd of 
March 2014, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that, as Russia would have 
gained effective control over the territory of Crimea: 
“It has violated Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State” 
(UNSC, S/PV.7125, 2014, p. 7).  
States and UN representatives were already denouncing Russia using its armed forces that 
had been in Crimea (UNSC, S/PV.7124, 2014). Then, Russia’s deployment of military 
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servicemen (or ‘little green men’) led to several states condemning what they called “an 
act of aggression” (EU, Res. 2014/2627, 2014; UNSC, SC/11319, 2014; S/PV.7125, 
2014; S/PV.7134, 2014), including the UK (S/PV.7125, 2014, p. 6) and the US ( 
S/PV.7125, 2014, p. 5) as permanent UNSC members. This was affirmed by legal 
scholars who described the deployment of these ‘little green men’ of all Russia’s actions 
in Crimea to be the clearest violation of international law – of the prohibition of force to 
be precise (Mälksoo, 2019, p. 305). 
As opposed to the previously analysed engagement with the norm through requesting and 
authorising military action, these practices by Russia involved the reported use of force 
as part of its intervention and annexation of Crimea. This time, Russia is not merely 
contesting and allegedly breaching the prohibition of the threat to use force, but 
contesting and allegedly breaching the prohibition of force as a whole. When taken 
together with Russia’s justifications for its actions, it becomes clearer which part of the 
norm Russia is contesting and which type of contestation is taken place.  
It is important to note that these justifications did not include statements of Russia openly 
admitting it had used force. Rather, they are responses by Russia to accusations and 
reactions from Ukraine and other states at the UN level, in which Russia aims to explain 
its actions. These justifications, however, still engage with the PoF norm and are therefore 
still relevant to this study.  
A closer look at Russia’s justifications to the international community engaging with the 
PoF norm demonstrate four different lines of reasoning, including the R2P, self-defence, 
self-determination of the peoples and intervention by invitation (Bilkova, 2015, p. 27). 
These lines were, however, mixed with one another rather than four separate arguments, 
and are visible in Russia’s justification. During the UNSC meeting on the 3rd of March, 
Russia’s representative to the UN, Mr. Churkin, explained the need for a Russian response 
as follows: “the issue is one of defending our citizens and compatriots, as well as the most 
import human right — the right to life.” (UNSC, S/PV.7125, 20143). These grounds are 
very similar to those provided in the appeal to the Federation Council to authorise force 
(Federation Council Res. 48-SF, 2014), implying a need for the anticipatory defence and 
protection of people and their human rights. The crisis in Crimea would for Russia be “an 
issue of lives and the fundamental norms of international law”, while for other states it 
would simply be “a game” (Mr. Churkin, UNSC, S/PV.7134, 2014, p. 14). Russia’s need 
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to intervene was described urgent – action needed to be taken because it concerned human 
rights but also because the UN would not be able to act soon enough. “We […] understand 
very well what international institutions are like […], it will take months to make the 
preparations for such a mission, so who knows what will happen there in the meantime?” 
(Mr. Churkin, UNSC, S/PV.7125, 2014, p. 17).  
The first two lines of reasoning visible in these justifications were similar to those 
provided on the 1st of March in the appeal to use force – they once more reflect the 
arguments along the lines of pre-emptive self-defence and the R2P. Russia emphasised 
the need to act before the situation worsened, before the UN could act, which directly 
relates to pre-emptive self-defence – taking action before having suffered an attack. 
Russia described the situation as facing a threat (UNSC, S/PV.7134, 2014, p. 15). This 
threat, in turn, would concern the lives and human rights of people in the territory, and 
how Russia would be the one to offer protection, the actor with the capability and 
‘responsibility’ to protect. Once more, Russia is contesting the exceptions of the PoF – it 
challenges when the norm is lifted, and when so, which behaviour is implied. It challenges 
the way in which a state should behave when the norm lifts – should it act quickly, or 
should it wait for the UN take action? In the UN Charter, the legal exception to the PoF 
of the right to self-defence applies until the USNC is able to act. That applies, however, 
only when the state has suffered an armed attack (U.N. Charter, 1945 art. 51). In this way, 
Russia is contesting the action implied by the norm’s exception, it is challenging the 
application of the norm’s exception.  
The contestation moreover concerns which problems – such as humanitarian crises – 
would allow other competing norms, being the R2P and pre-emptive self-defence, to take 
priority over the PoF norm. Accordingly, Russia’s contestation through discourse is 
meeting all of the indicators of applicatory contestation, concerning the implied 
behaviour, the circumstances/problems allowing for (in)action, and temporarily using 
competing norms.  
The other two lines of reasoning visible in Russia’s justifications, besides the R2P and 
anticipatory self-defence, also directly relate to the language of humanitarian 
intervention. Russia is moreover arguing along the lines of self-determination and 
intervention by invitation. Firstly, Russia’s representatives are referring to the right of 
self-determination of peoples, which tends to be used as a justification for humanitarian 
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intervention (as was the case of NATO’s intervention in the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (NATO, 2001, p. 39)). Mr. Churkin called on the importance to “seek the 
right balance between the principles of territorial integrity and the right to self-
determination.” (UNSC, S/PV.7134, 2014, p. 15). The UN representative emphasised that 
each case is different and should be analysed as such, in particular reference to Kosovo,  
and that in the case of Crimea, the right to self-determination was clearly facing “direct 
threats” (UNSC, S/PV.7134, 2014, pp. 15, 16). By doing so, Russia contested the 
exceptions to the prohibition of force norm again. By claiming the circumstances to be 
special, and for the right of self-determination to be more important than Ukraine’s 
sovereignty, Russia is challenging which special circumstances would allow other norms 
to take over the PoF. The use and discourse on competing norms and special 
circumstances constitute the indicators of applicatory contestation and these justifications 
by Russia will thus be counted this mode of contestation.  
The last line of argumentation by Russia engaging with the PoF norm comes down to 
intervention by invitation. Russia stated that both the Crimean Prime Minister Aksyonov 
(BBC News, 2014) and Ukrainian President Yanukovych would have given Russia 
consent to use its armed forces (UNSC, S/PV.7125, 2014, pp. 3, 4). If Russia’s practices 
were fully lawful on the grounds of ‘intervention by invitation’ and understood as such 
by the UN and the international community, this case would not have been selected as a 
severe case of contestation for this study. Without going into much detail on why the 
legality of Russia’s actions under this justification were questionable, it must be noted 
that Yanukovych was no longer in office by the end of February 2014 (Booth, 2014); that 
the Crimean Prime Minister’s approval alone would not suffice; and that if a state is 
invited, it does would not need to use force (U.N. International Law Commission, 
A/56/10, 2001 art. 20; UNSC, S/PV.7125, 2014, p. 5). The point to be made here is that 
Russia shifted the exceptions of the PoF norm even further, offering an additional grounds 
on which the PoF could be lifted, again contesting when the norm does not apply.  
To sum up, Russia’s actions directly engaging with the use of force are followed by four 
different justifications that contest the norm accordingly. These actions, in particular the 
deployment of the ‘little green men’ and the use of Russia’s military units already in 
Crimea, are justified by Russia in the light of the responsibility to protect, anticipatory 
self-defence, self-determination of peoples, and intervention by invitation. While the 
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findings above demonstrate that Russia engaged in contestation by claiming exceptions 
to the PoF norm on these grounds, that does not mean they are valid or accepted. Russia 
did not officially invoke any of these legal grounds, nor could it have – as legal scholars 
claim (Bilkova, 2015, p. 49; Yue, 2016, p. 190). Yet, as mentioned, this study does not 
aim to determine if Russia broke international law or specifically the PoF, but rather to 
present how Russia contested. 
Russia’s use of force and justifications are taken in this study as more severe contestation 
than the previous instance of requesting the use of force. Not only did Russia’s 
interventions and annexation allegedly breach the norm and cause controversy at the 
international level (UNSC, S/PV.7124, 2014; S/PV.7125, 2014; S/PV.7134, 2014), all of 
the justifications engaging with the PoF norm are considered to be challenging it. By 
implying that the R2P, anticipatory self-defence, intervention by invitation, and self-
determination are legitimate justifications for the use of force, the norm’s legal exceptions 
are taken to be shifted and its constraints to be lifted. Russia is not the first to contest the 
PoF norm with these practices, yet that does not take away that its actions do not affect 
the norm. The argument that others – meaning western actors – have engaged with the 
norm in a similar way, was central in Russia’s discursive claims (UNSC, S/PV.7125, 
2014, p. 17; S/PV.7134, 2014, p. 16). If the US was able to justify its humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo through NATO based the an allegedly threatening crisis of human 
rights including the right to self-determination, then Russia would to do the same (UNSC, 
S/PV.7134, 2014, p. 16). In this way, Russia can be seen as mimicking the rhetoric used 
in justifications for western-led interventions that Russia strongly opposed (Allison, 2014, 
p. 1260; Berg & Mölder, 2018, p. 412; Burai, 2016; Oskanian, 2018, p. 41). Russia’s 
justifications for not adhering to the PoF, accordingly, do not necessarily argue for the 
legality of its actions. Rather, Russia points to the West’s hypocrisy and double standards 
for condemning Russia’s practices while the West would have circumvented the PoF 
norm all the same (Berg & Mölder, 2018, p. 409; Mälksoo, 2015, p. 180).  
The mimicking of this behaviour fosters the confusion and ambiguity on the exceptions 
to the PoF norm. This engagement promotes the broadening of the norm’s scope and 
application, it promotes the notion that a state can be excused from adhering to the norm 
without meeting the legal criteria to so. Though this behaviour can be seen as promoting 
non-compliance, the effects of the contestation on the norm do not come into play yet. 
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Looking at what these practices by themselves challenge, they do not attack the norm’s 
core claims directly. Instead, these practices advocate that specific conditions involving 
competing norms may temporarily lead to behaviour different from what the norm itself 
denotes. Therefore, these actions and justifications of Russia engaging with the 
prohibition of force norm are meeting each of this study’s indicators for applicatory 
contestation.  
As a response to Russia’s actions, the UNSC aimed to adopt a resolution to destabilise 
the situation in Crimea. Not unsurprisingly, Russia voted against the adoption of the draft 
resolution on the 15th of March (UNSC, SC/11319, 2014). This veto by Russia is also 
considered as an instant of contestation of the prohibition of force norm.  
One day before the referendum on the independence of Crimea took place, the UNSC 
failed to pass the draft of a resolution on the non-recognition of the referendum and its 
results. This draft resolution did not only concern the results of the referendum, but also 
the situation in Crimea as a whole and called for a peaceful resolution in line with the 
UN’s core principles  (UNSC, SC/11328, 2014). The representatives of the US and Chad 
specifically mentioned that the draft was based on the Article 2 (4) of the Charter – on 
the prohibition of force (UNSC, S/PV.7138, 2014, pp. 3, 10). While all other UNSC 
members voted in favour, China abstained, and Russia vetoed (UNSC, S/PV.7138, 2014, 
p. 3).  
Russia’s act of vetoing a resolution that is based on the PoF is by itself an act of 
contestation. Even the draft resolution by itself, adopted or not, could have been 
considered an act of contestation as states debated the importance and interpretation of 
the PoF norm, though to a limited extent. Russia took part in this discourse, which it what 
this section will primarily consider (rather than all states’ contestation). Russia justified 
its decision by recalling the “principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” 
which, according to Mr. Churkin, were contradicted by this draft resolution (UNSC, 
S/PV.7138, 2014, p. 2). Accordingly, the norm was once more discursively contested 
through the argument of self-determination. Moreover, Churkin touched upon the 
specificity of the case in Crimea in comparison to other instances, and emphasised that 
the “principles of international law are closely interlinked and should be considered in 
light of the others” (UNSC, S/PV.7138, 2014, p. 2). 
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This act of vetoing the draft resolution and Russia’s subsequent justifications are also 
taken to contest the PoF norm. Responding to Russia’s decision, the representative of 
Lithuania fully quoted the PoF as enshrined in Article 2(4), urging that because the 
resolution was built on this norm central to the UN Charter, “The Russian Federation is 
challenging the very principles on which this organisation, the United Nations, is built 
and which supported the international system for the past decades.” (UNSC, S/PV.7138, 
2014, p. 6). The way in which Russia is challenging the norm in this instance is not very 
different from the last two cases. Russia first contested the norm by voting against the 
draft resolution based on this norm, and consequently emphasised the special conditions 
that allowed for a different norm – of self-determination – to be more important in this 
specific situation. Once again, Russia contested when and how the norm should be applied 
– Russia contested the norm’s application. 
Type of Norm Contestation by Russia 
These findings established that Russia behaviourally contested the PoF norm by 
requesting and approving the use of force in Crimea, by using force in Crimea, and by 
vetoing the draft resolution. In turn, Russia discursively contested the PoF norm with its 
justifications for these actions. According to this study’s indicators of validity and 
facticity contestation, Russia’s actions in Crimea can clearly be attributed to applicatory 
contestation. This can be seen from the parts of the norm that were contested as well as 
the way in which this was done. In other words, through these three instances Russia 
challenged which issues (threats to its own forces, to people’s lives, to human rights) 
trigger which behaviour (use of force, intervention by invitation, circumvention of 
UNSC) based on competing norms (R2P, self-defence, self-determination). This can be 
distinguished form validity application, which is directed against the core of the norm – 
in this case being the belief that states should refrain from the use of force against each 
other. The core is not considered to be ‘attacked’ these competing norms or moral 
standards were taken as permanently more important than the norm, but instead were 
prioritised based on a specific, temporary situation.  
As this study touched upon how states have usually engaged with the PoF norm, it can be 
insightful to also briefly present how Russia generally deals with the norm. A closer look 
at Russia’s approach demonstrates that the Russian Federation does not usually promote 
the application of the norm in the way that it contested the norm in Crimea. Instead, it 
tends to oppose these ‘additional conditions’ and strongly supports a strict and traditional 
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interpretation of the PoF norm (Allison, 2014, p. 1260; Mälksoo, 2015, p. 134), though 
one might disagree based on Russia’s actions in Georgia in 2008. In its Foreign Policy 
Concepts, the meaning-in-use of the PoF norm that Russia promotes is one based on 
principles such as non-interference (2016, p. 5 pt. 23) and sovereignty (p. 6 pt. 26b). Any 
attempts by states to interpret international norms to their own advantage, and specifically 
circumvention of the prohibition of force through the “responsibility to protect”, Russia 
intends to counter (p. 6 pt. 26b, p.7 pt. 26c).  In this official document, as well as among 
the international community (Allison, 2014, p. 1260; Mälksoo, 2014, p. 143; Welsh, 
2019, p. 60), Russia tends to emphasise that it considers the non-use of force as one of the 
most important norms that should allow for “arbitrary interpretations” (p. 9 pt. 31), and 
that it should not be easily lifted based on humanitarian considerations (p. 7 pt. 26c) or 
threats instead of an armed attack (p. 9 pt. 32).  
Russia thus proclaims and portrays itself as an actor that opposes contestation of the PoF 
norm, condemning not only violations but also alterations to its meaning and broadening 
of possible interpretations. Russia’s practices in Crimea can, on the one hand, be seen as 
a break with tradition, contesting the restrictionist version16 of the norm it so strongly 
promoted and using the doctrine it always contested (Allison, 2020, p. 7; Bilkova, 2015, 
p. 48; Gorenburg, 2019, p. 5). At the same time, Russia’s behaviour concerning the PoF 
norm, as well as its practices and discourse in Crimea, can both be seen as part of Russia’s 
advocacy of the strong and narrow definition, as outlined in Article 2 (4), instead of the 
broader and humanitarian application of the norm as previously done by the West. Rather 
than challenging the norm, Russia seems to aim at challenging how western states have 
been applying and interpreting exceptions to the PoF norm in the contemporary 
international order. This is visible in Russia’s use of similar justifications used for 
western-led interventions which Russia has always opposed (Allison, 2014, p. 1260; Berg 
& Mölder, 2018, p. 412; Burai, 2016; Oskanian, 2018, p. 41), as well as the specific 
references made by Russia to those interventions (UNSC, S/PV.7134, 2014, pp. 15, 16). 
The belief that Russia’s practices are not aimed at challenging the norm in general but 
rather attempt to challenge the ‘western’ meaning-in-use, however, should not preclude 
 
16 “Restrictionists, sometimes termed international legal positivists, claim that only unilateral and 
collective self-defence and Security Council enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter can 
form exceptions to the Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force.” (Allison, 2020, p. 7 note 3). 
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Russia from being capable to contest the PoF norm through these attempts. Whether or 
not Russia generally acknowledges the validity of the PoF norm, its actions and discourse 
in Crimea have been found to constitute contestation of the norm. This contestation by 
Russia in Crimea, nonetheless, focuses on the conditions of the norm’s application. 
Therefore, this study attributes Russia’s contestation of the PoF in Crimea to the 
applicatory type of contestation.  
The finding that Russia’s contestation would fall under applicatory contestation now 
enables this study to test the first hypothesis as formulated, which expects this type of 
contestation to lead to an increase in norm robustness (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, 
p. 58). The following section will be used to apply this theoretical expectation to the case 
of the PoF norm, which will lead us to see if this applicatory contestation by Russia did 
in fact lead to an increase in the robustness of the prohibition of force norm.  
Robustness of the Prohibition of Force Norm before and after Contestation 
The previous section established that the norm prohibiting the use of force was 
predominantly facing applicatory norm contestation by Russia in Crimea. This section, 
in turn, aims to test how Russia’s norm contestation affected the robustness of the PoF 
norm and if this, as expected, led to an increase in norm robustness.  To do so, the level 
of robustness of the PoF norm will be measured and compared over time, meaning before 
(t1) and after (t2) the annexation of Crimea. This study first measures the robustness of 
the norm from 2009 to 2013 (t1), followed by the period of 2014-2018 (t2), along the 
dimensions of the norm’s facticity and validity.17 As explained in the methods chapter, 
the facticity dimension concerns the extent to which states adhere to the norm. This first 
dimension is measured through the compliance indicator that determines how often the 
norm was invoked and used in decisions at the UNSC during t1 and t2. The second 
dimension of validity, in turn, will be measured through the general acceptance indicator 
that studies states’ general belief in the norm, in its interpretation and its importance, as 
well as the importance of the UN, as reflected in UN documents. Based on these 
indicators, the levels of facticity and validity will separately be ranked as low, moderately 
low, medium, moderately high, or high. The average of the level of facticity and validity 
 
17 The two dimensions of validity and facticity are further conceptualised in the theoretical chapter 
starting page 24 and operationalised starting from page 37 in the methodology chapter. 
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will constitute the overall level of robustness of the norm. The comparison of the 
robustness before and after Russia contested the PoF in Crimea will demonstrate if and 
how the norm’s robustness changed, and if it indeed – as theorised – strengthened after 
facing applicatory contestation.   
Prohibition of Force Norm Robustness before Contestation by Russa in Crimea 
(t1) 
 Facticity 
This study now proceeds to present the level of compliance with the PoF norm before it 
was contested at the start of 2014, examining the period from 2009 to 2013. The UN’s bi-
yearly repertoire demonstrates all instances in decisions were based on Article 2 (4) on 
the PoF and in which it was invoked.   
All decisions that were explicitly based on Article 2(4) from 2009 to 2013 were taken in 
the first year analysed – in 2009. Starting with this year, two of these resolutions were 
addressing the conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea (UNSC, S/RES/1862, 2009; 
S/RES/1907, 2009), and one resolution concerned the use of force and the protection of 
civilians in conflict (UNSC, S/RES/1894, 2009). The first two resolutions concerned the 
same case of (alleged) use of force, and is for the purpose of this study counted as one 
case. The last resolution did not concern a case of non-compliance or a violation and will 
therefore not be counted either. The norm was moreover invoked in the UN’s 
communication on the situation at the time in Nagorno Karabakh (UNSC, S/2009/51, 
2009). Based on one decision and one separate invocations, the PoF norm was invoked 
in two cases in the year 2009 (UNSC, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 
2008-2009, 2020). 
The next bi-yearly report on 2010 and 2011 demonstrates different numbers. No decisions 
were taken based on the PoF norm during this period. However, the norm was included 
in debate, as a UNSC meeting was held to address the use of force by Israel on 
international waters (S/PV.6325, 2010). Moreover, letters were sent to the UNSC by 
states, explicitly referencing to instances of non-compliance with to prohibit force. Iran 
sent a letter accusing the US of breaching the threat to use force (UNSC, S/2010/188, 
2010, p. 1), while Cambodia addressed the alleged acts of aggression by Thailand (UNSC, 
S/2011/58, 2011, p. 1). In the years 2010 and 2011, all together, there were three cases 
leading to the invocation of the norm, while zero decisions were explicitly based on the 
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norm (UNSC, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 2010-2011, 2020). It 
should be noted that in 2011 the UNSC authorised “all means necessary” – meaning the 
use of force – in the conflict in Libya (UNSC, S/RES/1973, 2011).18 This happened 
according to the exceptions prescribed by the PoF and therefore will not be counted as 
non-compliance.  
The last two years of t1, being 2012 and 2013, showed similar results to 2010-2011. Once 
again, no resolutions based on Article 2(4) were adopted. In turn, the norm was cited by 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo claiming that Rwanda would have circumvented 
Article 2(4) (UNSC, S/PV.6866, 2012, p. 3), and Iran accused Israel of using force against 
Syria (UNSC, S/2013/270, 2013, p. 1). All together, the norm was invoked in two cases 
(UNSC, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 2012-2013, 2020).  
The repertoire of the UN over five years, from 2009 to 2013, demonstrates one case that 
led to a decision based on the PoF norm and six others that led to the norm being invoked, 
adding up to a total of seven cases. This means that, according the to indicator of 
compliance, adherence to the norm in these years was relatively high. To be specific, a 
high level of facticity is considered to include zero to ten invocations. Because the 
compliance during this period comes down to seven cases in total, the level of facticity 
of the PoF norm during these five years comes down to high, yet closer to moderately 
high (10) than to the highest point of facticity (0).  
 Validity 
The second dimension of norm robustness now needs to be measured, which comes down 
to the extent to which states believe in the norm and its significance – the norm’s validity. 
The norm’s validity is measured through general acceptance that is demonstrated in UN 
documents from 2009 until the end of 2013 (t1). The examination of the UN documents 
also extends to accounts of UNGA meetings, which provided further insights into the 
debates regarding the PoF norm. 
The PoF was on the agenda of the UNSC meeting on the 29th of June in 2010, as the states 
planned to discuss the promotion of rule of law in the maintenance of peace (UNSC, 
S/PV.6347, 2010). Some states, like Russia and China, emphasised the importance of 
 
18 In this resolution, the UN condemned the use of force of Libyan authorities, yet the practice that was 
condemned concerned force against civilians rather than against another state and is therefore not part of 
this study (UNSC, S/RES/1970, 2011). 
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upholding the non-use of force when it comes to the promotion of the rule of law, and 
even “rejected” the practice of using force that is not in line with the Charter (UNSC, 
S/PV.6347, 2010, pp. 21, 24). Meanwhile, several other states tended to put the emphasis 
on human rights, and Denmark, Peru, and France specifically put emphasis on the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) (UNSC, S/PV.6347, 2010, pp. 3, 14, 15). Self-defence, 
another principle used to legitimise exceptions to the PoF norm, was prioritised by 
Azerbaijan. The representative, however, did mention that the use of this right should 
happen in accordance with the UN Charter (UNSC, S/PV.6347, 2010, p. 22). Most 
interestingly, Lebanon expressed concerns about the PoF norm, and the way in which the 
UN safeguarded this norm:  
“We continue to witness a selective application of the principle of preventing the use of 
force. This reality threatens to render that concept meaningless. It also constitutes a 
blatant violation of the rule of law. […] This reality is extremely dangerous because it 
creates the public perception that the international community is incapable of preventing 
these practices, which violate the principles of the United Nations and of international 
law, specifically […] the non-use of force.” (Mr. Salam, UNSC, S/PV.6347, 2010, pp. 
19, 20). 
Accordingly, this meeting topic was not based on the PoF norm per se, but states have 
brought up the topic and expressed relatively diverging views. The fact that states raised 
the importance of upholding the norm demonstrates, to a certain extent, states’ belief in 
the norm. However, even more states brought up the importance of a competing norm 
instead. Lebanon, in turn, expressed its concerns about the norm and especially about the 
UN’s ability to prevent states from resorting to breaches of this norm. On the one hand, 
the debate affirms a belief in the norm’s legitimacy to a certain extent, yet less so for this 
belief in the UN, nor does it demonstrate a consensus on the norm’s interpretation per se. 
Starting from 2011, several conflicts took place that caught the attention of the 
international community and triggered discourse on the PoF norm, for instance debates 
concerning when the UN could intervene and authorise the use of force or concerning the 
condemnation of the use of force by states. This was demonstrated in the debate on the 
conflict in Libya and which actions the international community should take in response. 
The UNSC adopted two resolutions to address the conflict and calling upon the 
responsibility to protect (UNSC, S/RES/1973, 2011, p. 1; S/RES/1970, 2011, p. 2) and 
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eventually authorising the use of force (UNSC, S/RES/1973, 2011).19 Even though these 
drafts passed, they did not do so without controversy. The countries abstaining from the 
vote emphasised the importance of using peaceful means instead of the use of force. 
Russia’s and India’s position was that the resolution was not clear enough about what the 
use of force would entail and what its scope would be, and would fear for the implications 
of these uncertainties (UNSC, S/PV.6498, 2011, pp. 5, 8; SC/10200, 2011). China, in 
turn, emphasised that it had always been an opponent of the use of force. Meanwhile, 
Germany’s representative spoke of the difficulties that decisions to use armed force 
brought along and that they should not be underestimated (UNSC, S/PV.6498, 2011, p. 
10). Brazil made a similar point, highlighting that the use of force might not be the 
solution to stop the violence and protect the people in Libya. Its representative stated that 
this course of action would be “causing more harm than good” to the people on the ground 
(Mrs. Viotti, UNSC, S/PV.6498, 2011, p. 6). These states questioned whether the PoF 
was truly lifted as a last resort; whether the UN was able to use it as intended; whether 
the norm’s meaning-in-use suggested that it should be lifted in such a situation and where 
the limitations of its interpretation lay (UNSC, SC/10200, 2011).  
Another conflict that sparked debate on the PoF norm and its use is the Syrian civil war. 
Once again, the UN tried to adopt resolutions to address the situation and failed three 
times during this period due to vetoes from Russia and China (UNSC, S/2011/612, 2011; 
S/2012/77, 2012; S/2012/538, 2012). The first resolution, urging Syrian authorities to 
stop using force against civilians, did not propose military intervention by the 
international community or the authorisation of the use of force per se, yet several states 
still disagreed with the resolution fearing for the PoF norm to be lifted (UNSC, SC/10403, 
2011; UNSC, SC/10704, 2012). According to some states, such as South Africa and 
Russia, the resolution did not reject the possibility to use force either and they would only 
support a resolution to which the principles of non-intervention and the non-use of force 
by states other than Syria would be central (UNSC, S/PV.6627, 2011, pp. 3, 4, 11). While 
the UK and Germany stated that they would have preferred a stronger approach (UNSC, 
S/PV.6627, 2011, pp. 2, 10), several countries expressed that they preferred a peaceful 
approach – such as China, Portugal, and Brazil (UNSC, S/PV.6627, 2011, pp. 5, 11; 
 
19 The UNSC authorises force by authorising the use of “all means necessary to protect civilians”, which 
included imposing a no-fly zone in the case of Libya (U.N. News, 2011; UNSC, S/RES/1973, 2011). 
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SC/10403, 2011). The debate furthermore demonstrated disagreement on the purpose of 
lifting the PoF norm and which issues it should address, in particular the issue of regime 
change as it did in the case of Libya. While primarily western states were in favour of the 
use of force to be lifted in order to bring about regime change in the country where the 
intervention would take place, others – such as India, Russia, South Africa – strongly 
aimed to prevent this objective to become part of the norm’s meaning-in-use (UNSC, 
S/PV.6627, 2011, pp. 4–6, 11). South Africa’s representative, for instance, stated that “the 
Council should not be part of any hidden agenda for regime change” (Mr. Baso Sangqu, 
UNSC, S/PV.6627, 2011, p. 11). Similar disagreements were reflected in debates on the 
Syrian conflict in the following years up until 2013. The discourse at the UN level 
concerning the Syrian crisis that engaged with the PoF norm showed that states generally 
disagreed on the importance and interpretation of the norm, on when the UN should and 
could legitimately lift it, and for which purpose it may be lifted (UNSC, SC/10403, 2011; 
SC/10704, 2012; SC/11160, 2013). 
The role of the PoF norm was moreover discussed in September 2013 at the UNGA 
meetings on the global fight against terrorism and the alleged use of chemical weapons 
by Syria. Summaries of these meetings (UNGA, GA/11429, 2013) demonstrate that 
concerns were voiced about the potential erosion of the PoF norm, in particular by Russia. 
Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that each intervention in the past “had demonstrated that 
it”, meaning the use of force to address problems, “was ineffective, meaningless, and 
destructive” (UNGA, GA/11429, 2013). The meetings generally displayed disagreement 
on how far the international community could go to counter or even prevent threats of 
terrorism and whether the use of military force would be acceptable as means to achieve 
this objective (UNGA, GA/11429, 2013). The issues raised in these meetings were similar 
to those displayed before in the debates on UNSC decisions.  
In all of these debates, states discuss the international response to conflicts, crises and 
alleged threats – referring to conflicts in Libya and Syria and addressing issues such as 
fighting terrorism and promoting the rule of law – and what the role of the PoF, or the use 
of force, should be in these responses. Most debates that include references to the PoF 
norm demonstrate a certain level of disagreement. In general, it can be said that even 
when the PoF norm is not on the agenda, states bring up its importance, which 
demonstrates that states regard the norm to be significant to a certain extent. Moreover, 
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though several states voiced their opposition, the majority of states still agreed on how to 
apply the norm in the resolutions. The majority of states do not seem to have diverging 
views on the interpretation of the norm. However, several of the states that do disagree 
tend to be part of the permanent members (P5) of the UNSC and this disagreement 
therefore matter as much as it can prevent resolution from being adopted. A lack of 
consensus on the norm’s application and interpretation among the P5 is seen as a relevant 
lack of consensus in this study. These states – the UK, US, France, Russia, and China – 
have diverging views on which grounds the norm may be lifted and for which purposes 
they may do. Several states moreover question the UN’s ability to respect the norm when 
it authorises the use of force or when it does not exclude this course of action.  
The question now remains what these findings mean for the level of validity of the PoF 
norm based on states’ general acceptance.  The level of moderately high is assigned when 
the majority of references to the norm demonstrate states’ belief in the norm’s legitimacy 
while the norm’s meaning-in-use, as well as the UN’s abilities may be slightly questioned. 
The medium level of validity would signify that about half of the references to the norm 
believe in its validity and the other half questions it, while there is a lack of a consensus 
on the norm’s interpretation and on the UN’s legitimacy. In the period of 2009 to 2013, 
most references to the norm expressed concerns about the PoF norm and demonstrated a 
lack of common understanding on how, when, and why the norm should be lifted and 
some questioned the UN’s ability to do so effectively and in line with the norm. At the 
same time, these concerns still highlighted the importance of the norm. Even though some 
states accused others of not taking the norm into account in the resolutions, states did not 
seem to disagree on the importance of the norm or claim that it was not important. 
Therefore, it can be said that the norm is still considered to be generally accepted; that 
the UN’s abilities are slightly questioned; but that there is a lack of consensus on the 
norm’s interpretation. Therefore, based on the general acceptance indicator, the norm’s 
validity from 2009 to 2013 is taken to be moderately high, yet close to the border of the 
medium level of validity.  
 Discussion of results t1 
The findings demonstrate that the robustness of the PoF norm in terms of facticity was 
high (yet close to moderately high) in the period 2009 to 2013, while it was moderately 
high (yet close to medium) in terms of validity. In other words, the norm’s robustness 
during this period has been impaired more by the discourse on the norm’s validity than 
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by non-compliance. The facticity dimension demonstrated that the PoF norm was 
discussed in the light of alleged violations and non-adherence on several occasions. These 
often led to discourses on the norm which were studied as part of the validity dimension. 
According to the theoretical framework on norm robustness and norm contestation, such 
debates can lead to the stabilisation of the norm’s meaning, a consensus on how the norm 
should be applied (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 58). In the case of the PoF norm, 
the importance of the norm often tended to be emphasised after it was violated or applied 
in a questionable manner according to states. Yet, at the same time, these debates did not 
lead states to agree or compromise on the norm’s meaning-in-use. Instead, the 
international approach seemed to reflect a crisis on how to deal with the norm prohibiting 
the use of force, and the norm found itself in a position where violations were not easily 
differentiated from behaviour in line with the norm. Therefore, this study concludes that 
during the period of 2009 to 2013, states did not entirely agree on the norm and its 
interpretation, while they at the same time did generally comply with the norm. The norm 
tended to guide states behaviour, making the level of facticity to be moderately high to 
high. Simultaneously, the norm was generally considered to be important yet there was a 
lack of acceptance in terms of the norm’s interpretation, leading to a medium to 
moderately high level of validity. As the level of overall norm robustness is based on both 
dimensions of facticity and validity, the robustness of the PoF norm from 2009 to 2013 
ends up being moderately high and closer to high (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Level of Robustness Prohibition of Force Norm at t1. 
 
Prohibition of Force Norm Robustness after Contestation by Russa in Crimea (t2) 
The level of robustness of the PoF norm has been established as moderately high before 
Russia’s contestation of the norm in Crimea in 2014. This section now aims to measure 
the level of norm robustness after this contestation (t2), in order to compare it to t1. Not 
only will this demonstrate the potential effects of Russia’s contestation on the norm’s 
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strength, but it will also provide the results necessary to reject or confirm the theoretical 
expectation that applicatory contestation leads to an increase of norm robustness 
(Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 58). To get there, the facticity and validity of the 
PoF norm need to be established once more, only this time in the period of 2014 to 2018, 
after Russia contested the norm’s application.  
 Facticity 
This study now proceeds to present the level of compliance with the PoF norm from the 
start of 2014 to the end of 2018. Once more, the bi-yearly and yearly repertoires on the 
UNSC’s practices are used to examine the number of instances that triggered either debate 
on the norm due to alleged violations or that led to the UN to adopt resolutions based on 
Article 2(4).  
The first two years that were analysed to measure compliance were 2014 and 2015, in 
which one decision took place that included Article 2(4) (UNSC, Repertoire of the 
Practice of the Security Council 2014-2015, 2020). However, this reference was made to 
Article 2 in its entirety, and related to the protection of individuals, in particular 
journalists, and not to the use of force by states against others (UNSC, S/RES/2222, 2015, 
p. 1), and was therefore not taken into consideration as an instance of non-compliance. 
The UNSC did, however, urge states to be reminded of the prohibition of the threat and 
use of force, warning both Israel and Syria (UNSC, S/RES/2163, 2014) as well as Yemen 
(UNSC, S/RES/2215, 2015). The PoF norm was moreover invoked in the 
communications on conflict of Crimea (UNSC, S/2014/136, 2014), which counts as an 
instance of non-compliance with the norm as part of this study, as well as in relation to 
alleged uses of force by Iran (UNSC, S/2014/759, 2014) and Turkey (UNSC, S/2014/428, 
2014). During the years of 2014 and 2015, there were five cases of alleged non-
compliance that led to the norm being invoked (UNSC, Repertoire of the Practice of the 
Security Council 2014-2015, 2020). 
In the next two years, being 2016 and 2017, there were again no decisions taken based 
directly on Article 2(4), yet it was invoked several times. Besides several cases that were 
already counted as part of 2014-2015, there were seven additional instances the UN or 
states individually invoke the PoF norm. Firstly, Israel-Palestine and Sudan-South Sudan 
conflicts led to the UN response affirming the PoF norm (UNSC, S/RES/2334, 2016; 
S/RES/2287, 2016). The norm was moreover invoked related to the alleged use of force 
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in Nagorno-Karabakh by both Armenia and Azerbaijan (UNSC, S/PV.7621, 2016, pp. 79, 
87), as well as allegations from Cyprus of the use of force by Turkey (UNSC, S/PV.7621, 
2016, p. 76) and from Djibouti accusing Eritrea (USNC, S/2016/300, 2016). There were 
moreover two cases where the threat to use forced was allegedly breached, one accusation 
from Lebanon against Syria (UNSC,S/2017/228, 2017) and from Korea against the US 
(UNSC, S/2017/303, 2017). Though there were no explicit decisions taken based on the 
PoF norm, there were seven instances in total from 2016 to the end of 2017 that related 
to non-compliance with the PoF norm.  
The last UN report under the loop of this study is from 2018. During this year, no 
decisions were adopted directly based on the PoF. However, there were 24 references to 
the norm in total, many more than the years before. Many of these nonetheless referred 
to the same cases or to previously counted cases. The new instances where the norm was 
invoked included the UK’s representative calling the Skripal attack by Russia a violation 
of Article 2(4) (UNSC, S/2018/218), Saudi Arabia being accused by Iran of breaching 
the norm (UNSC, S/2018/278) and the failed resolution drafted by Russia condemning 
airs strikes by the US, UK, and France against Syria as the unlawful use of force (UNSC, 
S/2018/355, 2018). Accordingly, three new cases where the PoF norm was invoked are 
added (UNSC, Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 2018, 2020).  
This study takes cases into account when they constitute an allegation of a new instance 
of non-compliance with the PoF norm by a state against a state. Based on this criterion, 
the period of 2014 to 2018 included fifteen different cases where the norm was invoked. 
This means that the level of facticity according to the general compliance indicator during 
this period comes down to being moderately high, as this level includes 11 to 20 cases.  
 Validity  
In turn, it needs to be established how the validity of the PoF norm – states’ belief in the 
norm’s legitimacy – has changed after Russia’s contestation, and whether it decreased 
alongside the norm’s facticity.  
Russia’s annexation of Crimea caused upheaval at the international level and led Russia 
to face condemnation from the international community, from international organisations, 
and individual states. To establish whether these condemnations reflect the PoF norm’s 
validity – states’ belief in the norm legitimacy – a closer look needs to be taken at how 
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these third-party reactions engaged with the norm and whether they specifically 
condemned Russia’s behaviour concerning the PoF norm.  
In UNSC debates during the annexation, Russia’s actions were discussed as “an act of 
aggression” by Ukraine, Australia, the UK and the US, despite the exclusion of this 
reference to the draft resolution due to a veto from Russia (UNSC, S/PV.7124, 2014; 
S/PV.7125, 2014; S/2014/189, 2014). The majority of states agreed that Russia’s actions 
fell outside of the framework of the UN Charter. Then, on the 27th of March 2014, the 
UNGA adopted Resolution 68/262 on the “Territorial integrity of Ukraine” by a large 
majority, in which it condemned Russia’s  “attempts to modify Ukraine’s borders through 
the threat or use of force” (UNGA, A/RES/68/262, 2014, p. 2 pt. 2). The condemnation 
of Russia’s practices was widespread and not limited to the UN nor to statements, as 
international organisations such as the EU and the G7 condemned the annexation and 
imposed sanctions on Russia (EU, Res. 2015/C 315/06, 2015; G-7 Leaders Statement 
2014). A large number of states responded individually as well, condemning Russia’s 
“act of aggression” (British UN Ambassador Grant, 2014; Government of Montenegro, 
2014; MFA Poland, 2020; Romanian President Basescu, 2014; U.S. Secretary of State 
Kerry, 2014), its “use of military forces”, and calling upon the “non-use of force in line 
with the Charter” (MFA Poland, 2020; New Zealand PM McCully, 2014; Philippines 
Department of Foreign Affairs, 2014; UNGA, GA/11429, 2013; UNSC, S/PV.7138, 
2014, pp. 6, 10; SC/11319, 2014). This demonstrates the widespread debate on the PoF 
norm and its abuse sparked by Russia’s practices in Crimea, which were greatly 
condemned. In debate that took place at the UN level concerning crisis in Crimea, the 
majority of states highlighted the importance of adherence to Article 2(4).  
This affirmation of the norm’s significance continued after states condemned Russia’s 
actions. During a plenary session of the UNGA, the representative of the Holy See pointed 
out the need for Article 2(4) to be transparently and genuinely applied to “exclude all 
unilateral use of force against another Member” (Archbishop Gallagher, UNGA, 
A/70/PV.27, 2015, p. 3). In the next  year, 2016, during a yearly UNSC meeting on the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the PoF norm was central to the 
discussion (UNSC, S/PV.7621, 2016). The representatives of around thirty different 
states (nearly all those present) explicitly referred to the PoF norm. Angola, for instance, 
called upon other countries to prevent the use of force when responding to international 
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problems (UNSC, S/PV.7621, 2016, p. 7), and France emphasised the need to “restrict 
the use of force within the boundaries of collective responsibility” (Mr. Delattre, UNSC, 
S/PV.7621, 2016, p. 12). Moreover, many states recalled Russia’s actions in Crimea in 
2014 when referring to the norm. Responding to these claims, Russia once more defended 
its actions by calling upon the principle of self-determination of peoples (UNSC, 
S/PV.7621, 2016, p. 29). However, Russia was not backed by other states, as the debate 
demonstrated a general consensus that PoF is not to be violated in generally, nor on those 
grounds. At a similar meeting in 2017 similar views were expressed, as Sweden’s 
representative stated that the decision of a state to use force and invade another state “is 
a threat to us all” when specifically talking about the conflict in Ukraine (Ms. Söder, 
UNSC, S/PV.7886, 2017, p. 16). One of the states who expressed a different view on the 
use of force in comparison to other states, was the UK. Its representative highlighted 
UNSC’s responsibility to intervene and take action against new threats, which would 
include the use of force (UNSC, S/PV.7621, 2016, p. 20). Meanwhile, the majority of 
states emphasised the non-use of force, some focusing on the non-unilateral use of force 
while others stressed that even collective action should not include the use of force.  
In 2018, the last year under the loop, many references were made to the PoF norm. The 
legitimacy of exceptions to the PoF norm were discussed at the 8175th meeting of the 
UNSC (UNSC, S/PV.8175, 2018). Mexico, for instance, drew attention to states 
attempting to the use right to self-defence, and military actions accordingly, when facing 
threats. The exercise of these attempts in combination with the  
“ambiguous language of recent Council resolutions, runs the risk of a de facto broadening 
of exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force, as set out in Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, in an irregular manner.” (Mr. Sandoval 
Mendiolea, UNSC, S/PV.8175, 2018, p. 58).  
This view was shared by other states as well, as Mr. Vieira on behalf of Brazil expressed 
that:  
“We should devote more attention to the working methods of the Council as they relate 
to the use of force. […] We live in challenging times in which we cannot allow for the 
erosion of the authority of the Charter, especially regarding the rules” (UNSC, 
S/PV.8175, 2018, pp. 24, 25).  
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The representative pointed specifically to self-defence and resolutions authorising the use 
of force, and that an increasing number of states would submit such requests to the UNSC 
as part of their desire to use force. It moreover called for the UN to use its power to uphold 
the PoF norm.  
A remarkable debate at UN level took place on the 17th of May 2018, afterwards described 
as “Security Council Must Rectify Failure to Prohibit Use of Force, Maintain 
International Peace, Speakers Stress in Day-long Debate” (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018; 
SC/13344, 2018). In regards to this “failure” to uphold the PoF norm, states pointed to 
violations in Myanmar, Syria, and Crimea. Many states stressed the importance of 
upholding the “hard-won gains in international law” that were under pressure since “the 
annexation of Crimea”, as described by the Dutch Representative (Mr. Blok, UNSC, 
S/PV.8262, 2018, p. 15). The meeting coverage shows that several states specifically 
referred to the PoF norm, condemning its violations, and urging the UN to uphold it. 
These were, among others:  
François Delattre (France) said that the UN should secure its position as a protector of 
international law, particularly when authorising the use of force, and by ensuring that 
violations thereof “do not go unpunished” (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018, p. 29). 
David Zalkaliani (Georgia) rendered the non-use of force as once at the core of the 
international order, and argued that “turning a blind eye to violations of international law 
emboldens the perpetrators anywhere in the world.” (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018, p. 37). 
Frederico S. Duque Estrada Meyer (Brazil) explicitly referred to Article 2(4) and 
expressed his concerns about states’ tendencies to invoke the use of force for protecting 
human rights or when facing threat, referring to anticipatory self-defence and 
humanitarian intervention. He emphasised that some states saw Article 2(4) as a “self-
help mechanism” or a means to respond to violations of international law. “Brazil does 
not share that view, as it considers that Article 2, paragraph 4, aims to reinforce 
prohibition of the use of force.” (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018, p. 45). 
Fatima Kyari Mohammed (African Union) emphasised that “the relevant provisions of 
the Charter must be strictly observed, especially when it comes to the use of force in 
international relations.” (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018, p. 62). 
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Mr. Ruda Santolaria (Peru) said that “one of the cornerstones of the international order 
is the prohibition of the use of force in any way that is incompatible with the Charter of 
the United Nations. We are concerned about the possibility that some countries are testing 
arguments and interpretations that are ultimately alien to international law and that 
undermine the system of collective security.” (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018, pp. 19, 20).  
At last, Mr. Polyanskiy (Russian Federation) emphasised that “the use of military force 
against a State is permitted only when sanctioned by the Security Council or for self-
defence, as paragraph 4 of Article 2 and Article 51 of the Charter clearly state in one of 
its best known and most widely cited provisions.” (UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018, p. 27). 
In the end, all these debates have one aspect in common – they reflect a revived debate 
on the PoF norm. The widespread condemnation of alleged uses of force can be seen as 
a sign of commitment of the international community to the norm, and that violations are 
not to be accepted. A stronger emphasis is put in debates in general on the norm, and 
when the norm is discussed, its significance tends to be emphasised. The debate still 
includes concerns on the UN’s ability to uphold the PoF, yet at the same time the calls 
for the UNSC to do so demonstrates that these states still consider the UN legitimate and 
capable to ensure compliance with the norm. Moreover, attention is drawn to the 
ambiguity of the norm’s exceptions that go beyond the UN Charter, especially concerning 
anticipatory self-defence and interventions concerning human rights. Though we can not 
yet speak of a renewed consensus on how the norm is to be applied and when it is lifted, 
states have emphasised more frequently and clearly which behaviour they find 
questionable and which behaviour they find acceptable. Condemnation of using 
justifications outside of the UN Charter and circumventing UNSC authorisation is more 
common. States still disagree on whether or not the UN itself should authorise the use of 
force in specific situations, and whether it is truly only done in cases of last resort, though 
most states now seem to agree that this authorisation is necessary before a state may use 
force.  
All together, the debate on the PoF is very alive during the years of 2014 to 2018 and 
demonstrate a larger emphasis on the norm’s importance than the previous period. Nearly 
all states have expressed their general belief in the norm’s legitimacy and condemnation 
of violations are widespread. The debate at UN level reflects states’ commitment to the 
norm and its peremptory character. States regard the norm to be at the centre of the 
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international system, a norm that is necessary to be upheld. At the same time, it shows 
that the same states regard the norm to be in crisis, finding it to be easily circumvented 
and violated, calling out the UN’s failure, yet imperative, to prohibit the use of force. It 
emphasised the need for the UN to regulate the use of force, rather than to act after 
violations have taken place.  States still question the UN’s ability to uphold the norm to 
a small extent and do not fully agree on the interpretation of the norm. The strong belief 
of states in the PoF norm fits the level of high validity in terms of general acceptance. 
However, states have not yet managed to agree on the norm’s meaning-in-use or to fully 
respect the legitimacy of the UN. Therefore, the norm ends up between the moderately 
high and high levels of validity.  
 Discussion of results t2 
In the end, this study finds the facticity dimension of the PoF norm’s robustness to be 
moderately high and the validity to be moderately high to high. The facticity of the norm’s 
robustness – how well states adhere to the norm – was measured with the compliance 
indicator through which this study found fifteen cases of alleged non-compliance over the 
course of five years – from 2014 to 2018. As the moderately high level is attributed to 11 
to 20 cases where the norm was invoked, the norm’s facticity ends up right in the centre 
of the moderately high level. In turn, the validity was measured through the indicator of 
general acceptance, which demonstrated that from 2014 to 2018, states strongly believed 
in the norm’s significance, yet they still questioned the norm’s interpretation and the UN’s 
legitimacy, which leaves the norm’s validity in between the levels of moderately high and 
high. This means that the norm’s validity was higher than the norm’s facticity over the 
course of these five years. In other words, the norm’s strength during this period 
originates more from states perception of the norm’s status and importance than from 
states’ adherence to the norm.  
Taking the levels of facticity and validity together, the former being moderately high and 
the latter moderately high to high, the norm’s overall robustness at t2 arrives in between 
these two levels. Meaning, from the period of 2014 to 2018, the PoF norm’s robustness 




Figure 4. Level of Robustness Prohibition of Force Norm at t2. 
It is important to note that the levels of the norm’s validity and facticity are different from 
the results at t1. The most interesting difference when comparing the findings from 2009-
2013 to 2014-2018, is that the norm’s facticity dimension of its robustness weakened 
while the validity dimension strengthened. The cases of non-compliance as part of the 
norm’s facticity more than doubled (from seven to fifteen) leading to nearly a full-level 
decrease in validity. This heightened level of non-compliance, however, did not lead to a 
less strong belief in the norm’s validity, but only increased it, for almost a full level. 
Surprisingly, the norm’s validity seems to have strengthened in a similar volume that the 
norm’s facticity weakened. This led to the norm’s overall robustness at t2 finishing at the 
same level of robustness at t1 (as illustrated in Figure 5).  
These findings signify that Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm in Crimea did not result 
in a different level of overall robustness. However, this does not mean that it did not affect 
the norm’s robustness. Instead, it means that the contestation affected the norm’s validity 
and facticity, yet – rather unexpectedly – in diverging directions. The PoF norm ended up 
with the same level of robustness before and after Russia’s contestation, not because the 
contestation had no effects, but because the dimensions of norm robustness did not 
increase or decrease alongside each other. The PoF norm was affected by Russia’s 
contestation even though the level of overall robustness did not change.  
 





This thesis aimed to investigate the connection between norm robustness and the type of 
norm contestation, or more specifically how the predominant type of contestation by 
Russia of the prohibition of force (PoF) norm affected the norm’s robustness. This study 
set out to address three issues: to test the framework on norm contestation types by 
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann; to determine the robustness of the prohibition of force 
norm; and to bring the international political debate on norms and norm literature closer 
to each other.  
For this purpose, the theoretical framework on norm contestation and norm robustness 
was elaborated upon, followed by an explanation of this study’s methodological 
considerations. These theoretical and methodological frameworks were then applied to 
the empirical case study of contestation by Russia and the effects on the PoF norm. The 
findings as presented in this study demonstrate that Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm 
fit the first type of contestation – applicatory contestation, which was expected to lead to 
an increase in norm robustness. The second section of the analysis consists of an 
examination of robustness before Russia’s annexation of Crimea from 2009 to 2013 (t1) 
and after (t2), from 2014 to 2018. This analysis showed that the two dimensions of 
robustness – being facticity and validity – developed in different directions. Because the 
level of the norm’s facticity was on the low side of high at t1 (F1) and the norm’s validity 
was on the low side of moderately high (V1), the norm’s robustness before Russia’s 
contestation was on the high side of moderately high (R1) as illustrated in Figure 5. In 
turn, the norm demonstrates to be affected by Russia’s contestation, as a change in 
validity and facticity is observed. It moreover illustrates that the norm’s facticity 
decreased to moderately high (F2), the norm’s validity increased to moderately high to 
high (V2), leaving the average level of robustness based on these two dimensions, once 
again, at the same level of moderately high (R2). 
The finding that the facticity and validity of the PoF norm’s robustness were both affected 
but one decreased and the other increased in similar volumes, resulting in the same level 
of robustness over time, differs from the framework’s expectations. Deitelhoff and 
Zimmermann’s framework predicted the dimensions to develop in the same direction and 
to lead to an increase of robustness based on the applicatory type of contestation that took 
place (2018, p. 58), which disables this study to affirm the theoretical expectations. 
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These findings do not affirm the theoretical expectations of Deitelhoff and Zimmermann, 
yet they do not prove the opposite, as applicatory contestation was not found to lead to a 
decrease in overall robustness either. The norm’s validity increased as theorised, but the 
norm’s facticity – against expectations – decreased, with the robustness altogether 
remaining at the same level. These scholars predicted that the effects on the norm’s 
robustness may be limited when the contestation in question was limited and part of an 
isolated event (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2018, p. 58). This was nevertheless not the 
case in this thesis, as contestation was clearly taking place through Russia’s non-
compliance with the norm and its subsequent justifications. Therefore, the testing of 
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s framework on norm robustness and types of contestation 
led to unexpected results which in turn has implications for their framework.  
This study’s testing of the theoretical framework provided useful insights into the 
empirical application of the theoretical expectations to a single case study. For instance, 
throughout the empirical application, the challenge arose of distinguishing the types of 
validity and applicatory from one another. For instance, when applied to a prohibitive 
norm as in this study, it was not clear whether the promotion of exceptions to this norm 
falls under applicatory or validity contestation, though this thesis eventually labelled it as 
applicatory contestation. The same applies to the differentiation between the norm’s 
validity and facticity as part of norm robustness. For instance, the acceptance of the norm 
(validity) can arguably be demonstrated by the level of compliance as well (facticity), and 
the facticity can also be seen in the justifications and third-party reactions that fall under 
validity. Even the framework’s variables of norm contestation and norm robustness 
seemed to overlap occasionally. Both variables aim to investigate practices of non-
compliance, justifications, and debates, and it can therefore be difficult to establish where 
norm contestation ends, and norm robustness begins. This issue was redressed in this 
thesis as it examined general engagement with the norm before and after the contestation 
as part of the norm robustness observations, while the variable of norm contestation only 
investigated Russia’s contestation in Crimea during four months in 2014. 
All of this suggests that further research needs to be done to specify the framework on 
norm robustness and contestation to make it appliable to other empirical cases. This study 
has made an attempt and invites others to follow. When doing so, the conditions and limits 
of this thesis should be considered, for instance that a legal and prohibitive norm was 
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chosen; that it focused primarily on UNSC members, and that the original indicators of 
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann had to be adjusted leaving certain dimensions unstudied. 
While these factors are not considered to have affected the overall results of this study, 
other empirical studies might be able to apply the framework using all indicators or to 
study the wider response of the international community. These implications should be 
taken as points of considerations for future studies, as this framework provided interesting 
insights and still allowed this thesis to achieve its objective, namely to study how Russia’s 
contestation affected the robustness of the PoF norm. 
In contrast to other norm literature, the framework provided by Deitelhoff and 
Zimmermann enabled this study to take norm contestation as an independent variable and 
to examine how the PoF norm was contested. It demonstrated that the concept of norm 
contestation is not simply ‘one way’ of dealing with norms but comes in different forms. 
Namely, in the case of Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm in Crimea, it came in the 
form of applicatory contestation. Moreover, it allowed for observation of levels of 
robustness along two dimensions of validity and facticity which in particular has proven 
to be very insightful, as the dimensions did not increase or decrease hand in hand. Though 
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann did not theorise that the norm’s validity and facticity may 
change in different directions, the analytical distinction they used allowed this study to 
observe the difference, which may be very useful for future studies. 
The findings of this thesis, especially difference found between the robustness 
dimensions, also have implications for norm literature. Even though norm scholars tend 
to agree that facing contestation is inherent to norms (Brunnée & Toope, 2017; Deitelhoff 
& Zimmermann, 2018, p. 52; Wiener, 2014), the effects of this contestation on the norm 
are still understudied (Sandholtz, 2019, p. 139). This thesis, in turn, called on norm 
scholarship to pay more attention not to if norm contestation is taking place but to how it 
takes place and to which effects. Moreover, the findings of this study’s application of 
Deitelhoff and Zimmermann’s framework validate the need to measure norm robustness 
along these two dimensions rather than taking robustness as either validity or facticity. It 
demonstrates that the contestation of a norm can happen in different ways and may lead 
to the norm strengthening in terms of states’ general belief in the norm but weakening in 
terms of compliance, or vice versa. Future norm studies can benefit from these findings 
by theorising and analysing the distinction between the subjective and objective element 
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of a norm (referring to validity and facticity) and how they are affected differently by the 
two types of contestation.  
Lastly, these findings also have implications on the prohibition of force norm itself. The 
findings of this study, on the one hand, affirm the labels of (relatively) ‘strong’ or ‘robust’ 
that have been ascribed to the norm by other norms scholars norm (Brunnée & Toope, 
2017, p. 2; Sandholtz, 2019, p. 142) as the norm’s robustness was found to be moderately 
high to high. The norm generally guides states’ actions and norm addressees seem to 
believe in the norm’s legitimacy, as should be the case for a peremptory norm. At the 
same time, it can be argued that the norm is circumvented surprisingly often and easily 
for a peremptory norm (Sayapin & Tsybulenko, 2018, p. 15), that – when broken –  can 
cost lives and hinder peace. The claims made by states in international discourse pointing 
to the increase of violations of the PoF norm ever since Russia challenged the norm 
(UNSC, S/PV.8262, 2018), were not proven to be wrong. If one were to base a norm’s 
strength on the level of compliance solely, then the PoF norm can indeed be considered 
to have suffered a loss of robustness after its contestation by Russia. The norm’s 
robustness is moreover impaired by a lack of consensus on the norm’s meaning-in-use 
and a lack of belief in the UNSC’s ability to uphold the norm. Previous contestation of 
the norm has resulted in a broadening of the norm’s scope with blurry lines between 
violations and legitimate exceptions to the norm. Whether this mode of contestation and 
lack of change in robustness is common for norms in general, requires further research 
comparing the PoF norm to others.     
However, Russia’s contestation did lead to states’ commitment to the norm being voiced 
more often and more vigorously. States do not have a common interpretation of the norm, 
yet they have expressed their desire for one, expressing what behaviour they consider to 
be acceptable and what they do not. They have expressed their concerns about the UN’s 
ability to uphold the norm, but also their desire for the UN to do so, which demonstrates 
that states have not lost faith in the norm or the organisation. Accordingly, Russia’s 
contestation was followed by less compliance with the norm but a stronger belief in the 
norm’s legitimacy. Therefore, this study answers the “Who killed Article 2(4)?” question 




It remains unsure what the future practice of international relations has in store for norms 
underpinning the world order, including the prohibition of force norm. The fact that many 
of these norms were designed to meet the circumstances almost eighty ago, but are to be 
applied to the contemporary international order and current means of warfare, 
demonstrates the need for norm approaches that consider their meanings-in-use as well 
as their contestation. Norms can be interpreted differently according to the actor, but also 
according to times and to the context they are applied to, which invites further research 
that studies contestation beyond the practices of actors. For now, however, this study 
believes that the norm scholarship in IR can still greatly contribute from further studies 
on the link between norm contestation and norm robustness. This thesis especially invites 
further empirical studies to apply the concept of norm contestation as this study has – 
considering norm contestation not to be limited to disapproval of the norm or to the actor’s 
intentions, but instead to be expressed in many different and unexpected ways. 
In the end, this study first demonstrated that Russia’s contestation of the PoF norm took 
place through applicatory contestation, which eventually strengthened the norm’s 
validity but weakened its facticity, leaving the norm’s robustness at the same level as 
before Russia’s contestation – being moderately high. While the framework on norm 
robustness and types of norm contestation proved to be very insightful, its predictions 
were not affirmed. However, these findings highlighted the significance of the analytical 
distinction between the norm’s robustness in terms of validity and facticity. Secondly, 
this study concludes that, during the period under review, the PoF norm is not eroding 
and definitely not dying. Even though the PoF norm is clearly contested, it is alive and 
well. Last but not least, this thesis resorted to IR’s norm literature, as well as to 
international debates engaging with norms – bringing international relations as a field of 
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